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ABSTRACT 
 
 
          This paper presents an analysis of the Angolan agricultural sector together with a 
review of the principal constraints to development.  A set of recommendations are 
presented as to possible policies and investments that would help to promote growth.  
Emphasis is placed both on the aftereffects of the decades long civil war that ended in 
2002 as well as the distortions that result from Angola’s status as an oil exporter. 
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Figure 1:  Republic of Angola 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
A STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA 
 
September 2004 
 
Introduction 
 
 This paper presents the rationale for a market oriented strategy for agricultural 
development in Angola.  It is intended to form a basis for discussion between the 
Government and donors with an interest in assisting in this area. 
 
 This strategy is coming at a key moment in Angola’s history.  With the end of the 
decades-long civil war now two years in the past, the country is poised to move beyond 
the emergency and resettlement phases of assistance to a phase of rehabilitation and 
development.  Rehabilitation efforts will take many years, focusing not only on physical 
infrastructure (especially roads) but also on the institutional and private sector needs for a 
well functioning liberalized economy. 
 
 Typically, rehabilitation (rebuilding that which already existed previously) can 
proceed much faster than development (building new capacity) and this is true to some 
extent in Angola as it is elsewhere.  However, in the Angolan case, much of what might  
be labeled “rehabilitation” is in fact much more developmental in nature due to the long 
disruption of rural areas and the near total departure of many Portuguese settlers who 
formed the core of the pre-independence rural economic and marketing systems. 
 
 A review of Angola’s history and natural resource base make it abundantly 
obvious that there is every reason to hope for success in promoting agricultural 
development in this country.  A large smallholder sector, accustomed to producing for the 
market, and with a demonstrated responsiveness to market incentives, can with the 
required support become a true engine of growth for the country.  In addition, there are 
already in existence a variety of larger commercially oriented farms geared toward 
market production. 
 
 It is important to bear in mind the problems associated with Angola’s large and 
growing oil receipts.  The distortions typical of resource-curse economies afflict Angola, 
with a real exchange rate appreciation that, if continued, will endanger the 
competitiveness of Angolan producers as suppliers to major domestic demand centers.  
The experience of Nigeria is one which can be regarded as a cautionary example for 
macroeconomic management in Angola. 
 
 In addition, it is also clear that Angola is far from the NEPAD recommendation of 
spending 10% of its budget on agriculture.   Currently, the sector is budgeted for only 
about a tenth of this amount, while budget execution resulted in an even lower 
proportion.  Increasing the priority given to agriculture will be an important topic for 
 x
dialogue in the future. 
 
 A cautionary note is in order.  While “agricultural development” and “poverty 
alleviation & food security” have a large degree of overlap, they are not the same thing.  
That is to say, an emergency poverty alleviation program such as those which have been 
the primary form of donor assistance in Angola for many years, is aimed at the poorest of 
the poor in an effort to reduce their vulnerability to adverse circumstances.  An 
agricultural development program should be aimed at those areas which are capable of 
generating the highest returns to investment.  Though  poverty alleviation will certainly 
be one important outcome of this, it is not the overriding objective as it is in emergency 
and humanitarian aid efforts. 
 
 The following sections detail the reasons for choosing a market oriented strategy 
and the basic components such a strategy would include.  This is followed by a summary 
of the institutional needs in terms of reform and strengthening, and is followed by a 
summary of an action plan to implement this strategy. 
 
 
Why A Market Oriented Strategy for Large and Small Farms? 
 
 Any realistic vision of the future for Angolan agriculture will include a mix of 
both large and small farms.  This is appropriate and to be encouraged inasmuch as it is a 
reflection of the present situation as much as a forward looking vision.  It must be 
stressed that much of the proposed strategy will benefit all producers since all need 
improved transport infrastructure, a modern marketing system and a conducive regulatory 
environment.  Indeed, large farmes may well provide growth poles for smaller producers 
in some areas and are often well positioned to respond rapidly to market opportunities. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is good reason for a government strategy to emphasize 
assistance to smallholders.  The overarching reason is that these households, constituting 
a majority of the Angolan population, are less able to make needed investments than are 
larger farmers.  Beyond this there are compelling reasons at both the micro and macro 
levels for such an emphasis. 
 
 At the micro level the need for an emphasis on aid to smallholders  can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
- Economic Efficiency – There are decades of studies around the world demonstrating the 
economic advantages of a smallholder oriented strategy. Apart from that, the Angolan 
evidence demonstrates that there are large gains to be had from relatively small 
investments in on-farm improvements, recapitalization and reactivation of marketing. 
 
-  Poverty Alleviation – The majority of Angola’s poor are located in rural areas and most 
of them rely on farming for the majority of their income.  Only through a broad based rise 
in incomes and welfare in rural areas can the goals of the Strategy to Combat Poverty be 
achieved. 
 xi 
 
 
-  Social Cohesion – After the long civil war and the massive dislocations that 
accompanied it, millions of rural Angolans are newly settled or resettled in rural areas.  In 
order for these populations to maximize physical security as well as welfare and the 
ability to achieve minimum subsistence levels of income it will be important to support 
the development of viable rural communities together with the income generating 
activities they rely on.  This is particularly important for demobilized soldiers. 
 
- Political Reconciliation – Many of the most important agricultural areas are populated 
primarily by former supporters of UNITA, which lost the civil war to the governing 
MPLA party.  It is in the long term interest of the country to demonstrate the importance 
of these peoples’ welfare by assisting their return to pre-conflict levels of production and 
welfare and to integrate them into the national economy as much as possible 
 
 
 At the macro level, such an effort is equally important, indeed imperative for the 
following reasons: 
 
-  In the near term, donor withdrawal from the large food aid programs of the present and 
recent past will leave the country with a massive deficit in food production.  
Approximately half of Angola’s grain needs are currently met through imports, much of 
these free or concessional, and filling this gap may well constitute a problem of 
emergency proportions.  Historically, smallholders have been the source of Angola’s 
marketed grain surpluses and it is to them we must look for increases in production in the 
future. 
 
-  In the long run, the overall development of the country depends upon successful 
development of the agricultural sector.  To fail at this task will retard the overall growth 
of the country through increased import requirements, increased rural-urban migration, 
and widespread poverty.   
 
-  The adverse macroeconomic effects of the country’s massive oil receipts put traded 
sectors such as agriculture at a huge disadvantage.  Only through investments in higher 
productivity can the country hope to avoid wholesale stagnation in this sector given the 
likelihood of continued appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
 
 
How to Promote Smallholder Development in Angola 
 
 The process of independence together with the long civil conflict that ended only 
two years ago has left much of rural Angola in a state of near total destruction, destitution 
and decapitalization.  Rehabilitating the rural society and economy will require a broad 
effort focusing on virtually all parts of the farming system and its social supports.  Doing 
what is necessary will not be possible throughout the entire country during this initial 
phase. Accordingly, it is proposed that the first efforts focus on demonstrating the 
possibilities of success in a few areas that are particularly important and well endowed in 
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terms of resources, market proximity, and tradition of market-oriented production.  
Broadly speaking, the needs can be categorized as follows: 
 
-  Perhaps the most striking lack in many areas is the near total destruction of rural 
marketing institutions and infrastructure.  Without an outlet for their produce, 
smallholder development at the farm level will be for naught.  Among the most pressing 
needs for promotion of marketing are: 
 
 -  Road, bridge and rail rehabilitation and demining.  Many villages even now live 
 in near total isolation.  Improving market access and rehabilitating roads to the 
 point where vehicles can easily pass will go far toward promoting market activity 
 
 -  Producer associations have proven effective in the Angolan context in 
 supporting marketing by smallholders as well as providing a way to mediate 
 support efforts in terms of credit, extension, and input purchase. 
 
 -  The efficacy of higher level marketing institutions such as the apex association, 
 Epungu, are unclear.  Given the potential for these to be used as instruments of 
 price or distribution control, direct support may not be appropriate. 
 
-  Farm level support should focus on help in commercializing (on both the input and 
output sides) and recapitalizing production, in addition to technical improvements in 
terms of seeds and implements.  Principal needs include: 
 
 -  Support of improved and decentralized agricultural extension.  The government 
 has recently announced a general plan to decentralize government functions; this 
 deserves financial support at the decentralized level as well as assistance in 
 defining the relationship between extension, farmers and the central government. 
 
 -    Support for farm-centered research into improved seeds and the development 
 of public and private sector institutions needed to develop these and perform 
 multiplication and distribution to smallholders.   
 
 -  Support recapitalization of smallholders and the expansion of micro-credit 
 operations supporting small farmers as well as small rural enterprises (implement 
 production, food processing, small trading, etc.) which have proven effective in 
 the Angolan context.  Particularly important is support for recapitalization;  
 among the most important needs are draft animals, implements, crop storage and 
 water control. 
 
-  Support the development of research and education in agriculture and the linkages of 
these with rural extension 
 
 -  The principal agricultural research institutions, IIA and IVA, were virtually 
 completely destroyed by the war.  Reconstituting these as institutions directly 
 responsible to their client population of small farmers is a key element in 
 xiii 
 
 promoting improved farm technologies. 
 
 -  The Faculdade de Ciencias Agrarias is newly reopened in Huambo at the site of 
 the IIA research station.  This connection is to be encouraged and supported.  The 
 FCA itself is a key link in that it provides both researchers for the research 
 institutes as well as staff for the extension system and government.  Many of the 
 current staff are nearing retirement and/or may have little training in assisting a 
 market oriented liberalized agricultural sector. 
 
 - Equally important are the facilities for training of tecnicos basicos and medios, 
 all of which were damaged in the conflict 
 
 
 
 
Institutional and Policy Reform 
 
 Much of the institutional apparatus of the Angolan government is unchanged from 
its command-economy structure of the past.  In addition, lack of funding and low salaries 
have contributed to low morale and balkanization of units within the Ministry as they 
have little capacity to link with client populations or other units within the government.  
In addition, there are some areas where remaining controls on the economy work to the 
detriment of progress in rural development.   
 
 While support for reforms of the central Ministerial functions would be beneficial, 
the primary thrust of this strategy is to assist the government in its desire to decentralize 
services by supporting rehabilitation and capacity building at the provincial and lower 
levels.  In particular, extension services are located at the municipio level and it is here 
that assistance can have the greatest impact on target populations.  Rural activities, 
particularly agriculture, are probably the best single example of a governmental function 
that would be most efficiently performed under a decentralized system. 
 
Principal recommendations for policy reform include: 
 
-  Abolish remaining controls on marketing, particularly margin controls on the profits of 
traders which are implemented by the Ministry of Commerce and enforced by the 
Economic Police 
 
- Publicly announce the government’s intention to refrain from any involvement in 
fertilizer sale or distribution and eliminate all barriers to import of this and other 
agricultural imports.  As an interim measure to deal with the market’s inability to 
overcome risks associated with input markets, auction donated or other fertilizer imports 
in provincial capitals.  In the longer term, consider guarantees to support financing of 
private sector imports and consider the feasibility of domestic production. 
 
-  Reform the structure of MINADER to put extension and research under unified 
 xiv
management with the explicit mission of improving conditions of smallholder 
agriculture.  This could be accomplished through a joint research/extension committee 
with oversight responsibility staffed with representatives from the research institutes, the 
extension system, the university faculty of agriculture, and farmer associations. 
 
-  Create a high level policy analysis unit in MINADER capable of analyzing policy 
alternatives and appraising projects according to commonly accepted standards.  This 
would require the following: 
 
 -  Training and education for existing staff 
 -  Recruitment of new staff recently trained in economics  
 -  A study tour for senior staff to Mozambique to see what has been done there  
  would be very useful 
 
-  Improve and make independent a statistical unit within MINADER, and perform a 
basic national agricultural survey to establish baseline data regarding areas planted and 
amounts harvested. 
 
-  Support the ongoing reform of the IDA, the extension system, to explicitly define it as 
a primarily decentralized institution based on farm-centered assistance, and the necessary 
resources should be made available to do this.  Central functions such as data collection 
and technical backstopping should be clearly defined. 
 
-  Reform the institutions responsible for land tenure, cadastre and registration to ensure 
greater transparency and protection for the rights of smallholders.  In addition, assistance 
in finalizing the legal framework surrounding land titling is important.  Operationally, it 
would be best to regard current donor efforts in this area as pilot projects, to be evaluated 
for potential duplication and support in additional areas of the country. 
 
-  Support reform the DNHER by assisting in the definition of a national irrigation policy, 
and moving the primary thrust of government efforts from promoting and managing 
irrigation systems to reorient it toward research in appropriate technologies for the 
smallholder sector.  Water control in this context is not best done as an independent 
project;  rather, it should be part of the overall effort to raise production so that costs and 
benefits can be compared with all other potential interventions and investments.  Existing 
large irrigation schemes constitute a sunk cost and as such, the best course for the 
government is to evaluate them with an eye toward the best way to constitute them as 
self-sustaining cooperative or private sector ventures. 
 
-  Perform an overall manpower study of MINADER in order to identify redundant or 
unproductive positions and formulate a plan for elimination of these so that those 
remaining can be better supported. 
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A STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA* 
 
September 2004 
 
Steven Kyle 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 This report was written to form the basis for a discussion with the Government of 
Angola regarding its policies toward rural areas and the agricultural sector.  The report 
summarizes the current situation in agriculture and discusses the various constraints and 
policy options facing the government as it seeks to rehabilitate and develop production.  
It should be noted that what is presented here is not all that might be included under the 
headings, “rural development” and “food security”,  since these encompass social sectors, 
infrastructure, commercial as well as  productive sectors.  This report will focus primarily 
on how to reactivate the rural economy and with it the ability of rural people to assure 
themselves and the country of food security in a sustainable way.  Given the natural 
resources and population of Angola, this clearly implies a heavy emphasis on agriculture, 
since it is both the primary means of support for most and also of key importance in 
reactivating the non-mineral economy in general. 
 
The Strategy to Combat Poverty and the Agricultural Sector 
 
 There can be no doubt in Angola that the need for assistance to the poorest 
segments of society is as great as anywhere else on the continent.  After the ravages of a 
decades long civil war, the country still has yet to extend even the most basic services to 
large parts of the countryside.  This, together with the need to return rural populations 
(many recently resettled) to a self-sustaining level of production and income, make it 
imperative to emphasize agricultural development as an integral part of the overall 
strategy to reduce poverty in the country. 
 
 
                                                
Indeed, the government has explicitly done just this.  The Estrategia de Combate a 
Pobreza, currently in the final stages of preparation, puts rural development and food 
security high up on its list of priorities.  Given the fact that the majority of the population 
depends on 
agriculture 
directly, and that 
many of the 
poorest are 
included in this 
group, this is 
something to be 
supported by 
donors.  One 
Demographic and Welfare Indicators in Angola 2001 2002
Population, total  12.7 million 13.1 million 
Population growth (annual %)  2.9 2.9 
Life expectancy (years)  .. 46.7 
Fertility rate (births per woman)  .. 7.0 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)  .. 154.0 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children)  .. 260.0 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)  44.7 .. 
Child malnutrition, weight for age (% of under 5)  30.5 .. 
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 mos)  72.0 74.0 
Prevalence of HIV (female, % ages 15-24)  5.7 .. 
 
* The work on this study was funded by the World Bank.  This is, however, not an official World Bank 
document. 
important aspect of the ECP, and one which is entirely shared by the strategy laid out in 
this report, is the idea that agricultural development and food security require a vision 
and a set of interventions that are much broader than agricultural production alone. 
 
 The process of implementing the ECP involves a distinct change in the 
government’s overall focus in terms of assistance to poor populations as the initial phase 
of humanitarian aid and resettlement/rehabilitation gives way to a more purely 
developmental type of intervention.  This shift is also reflected among the many foreign 
donors active in Angola.  Within the agricultural sector this shift is typified by moves 
away from provision of such transitional aid as packages of seeds and tools for newly 
resettled families and toward longer term aid designed to reactivate a viable commercial 
agriculture sector. 
 
 The World Bank’s EMRP project is a first step in this general direction, focusing 
on road building and seed production, but it is only a first step;  a true agricultural 
development strategy, such as that proposed here must take a far broader view.  Other 
donors have already begun the effort, with the EU initiating a shift toward a more 
developmental approach with the anticipated end of its Transitional Support Program at 
the end of 1995.  The various UN agencies have been extremely important in all of the 
humanitarian efforts for many years, but here too there is the beginnings of a shift as 
shown by the FAO’s recent Agricultural Sector Review.1 
 
 Reactivation of the rural economy will take a sustained effort across a broad front.  
A key contention of the strategy laid out in this report is that assistance at the farm level, 
while absolutely necessary, is not in itself sufficient.  Rather, given the complete lack of a 
marketing system in most areas together with the reliance on imported supplies by major 
coastal demand centers, a major effort to develop (or redevelop in many cases) links 
between farms and markets will be fundamental to a successful strategy. 
 
 The strategy envisions a future agricultural sector with a mix of farm types and 
sizes but proposes an emphasis on assistance to smallholders.  There is no lack of 
evidence around the world that promoting a dualistic large farm sector in Angola would 
not only be inefficient, but would create the foundation for social and political problems 
in the future that are currently being suffered elsewhere in Africa and the world.  That 
such a smallholder strategy can succeed is evidenced by the strong response of Angolan 
peasants to market incentives both now and in the past.  However, it requires a broad 
effort to put in place the supporting institutional framework that will enable small farmers 
to advance. 
 
 Infrastructure investment, particularly in roads, is a need that it would be difficult 
to overemphasize.  Anyone who has attempted to drive any distance in the countryside 
can attest to the extremely deteriorated state of roads, while many rural communities 
remain in almost total isolation.  Road and bridge repair together with continued 
demining activities will be major features of any successful strategy.  Also important are 
recapitalization at both the farm level and at the level of the marketing system.  Though 
each requires a somewhat different approach, the near total destitution of many is a 
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lasting result of the long civil conflict. 
 
 The macroeconomic context is extremely important in Angola.  After several 
years of adverse movements in the real exchange rate due to oil and diamond funded 
inflows of foreign exchange, relative prices are now arguably not far from the point at 
which imports could compete with domestic production even in the interior of the 
country.  Accordingly, macroeconomic management, though not geared to the needs of 
rural areas, will be of fundamental importance to any successful strategy. 
 
 This paper draws on the recent FAO Agriculture Sector Survey of 2003-2004 as 
well as four working papers written subsequently under the auspices of the World Bank 
and FAO.2  This strategy does not purport to provide a complete in depth analysis of all 
of the issues – insofar as data permits, this was done by the FAO study and subsequent 
Economic and Sector Work.  Further analysis will depend on additional data collection in 
most cases where it is necessary.  Nevertheless, this strategy provides a view of the 
sector’s needs and the ways in which Bank assistance can contribute to success both in 
terms of investments and in terms of policy reforms.  Pulling all of the diverse threads 
into a single coherent view of the way forward is something that could not be achieved by 
the dozens of sub-sectoral analyses performed by the FAO and subsequent studies. 
 
 
II. Demography and Natural Resource Base 
 
 Between 60% and 70% of Angolans earn their living from agriculture, which 
accounts for less than 10% of GDP.  With a relatively small population of approximately 
14 million (growing at 2.9% p.a.)  and population density of about 10 inhabitants per 
square kilometer, Angola is well endowed with agricultural resources and has the 
potential to grow a wide range of tropical and semi-tropical crops.  Prior to independence 
in 1975 Angola was self sufficient in food and exported numerous crops, of which coffee 
was the most important.  Exportable surpluses of grain were for the most part produced 
using traditional technologies and few modern inputs.  So, not only is Angola a natural 
food and cash crop producer and exporter, but there is considerable potential for growth 
through modernization and technical change. During the colonial period, agriculture had 
a dual structure, with a commercial sector of about 800,000 ha. managed by Portuguese 
settlers using modern technologies, and a traditional sector composed primarily of 
subsistence smallholders cultivating about 3.4 million ha.   
 
 After independence most of the settlers left the country and many of the former 
commercial farms and plantations were converted into state farms, which have now been 
privatized.  The civil war resulted in a virtual collapse of marketed production as large 
numbers of rural inhabitants either fled or reverted to subsistence production. 
Infrastructure suffered greatly with widespread destruction of roads, bridges and 
warehouses together with the presence of thousands of land mines in rural areas.   
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 Agro-climactic conditions vary widely, from humid tropical lowlands in the north 
and northeast to desert on the southern coast bordering Namibia.  The central highlands 
contain large areas with good rainfall (1500-2000 mm/year), relatively moderate 
temperatures, and are also the region with the highest population density.  Soils, though 
adequate is some locales, are generally depleted of at least some macronutrients and 
require fertilization for sustained cultivation.  The coastal and southern areas are far 
dryer, with average rainfall of less than 100 mm/year in southwestern desert areas and 
between 500 and 1000 mm/year in the four southern provinces of Namibe, Huila, Cunene 
and Cuando Cubango.  Irrigation is essential to production in these zones, and fortunately 
there are abundant surface and subsurface sources, many of which have been developed 
to some degree. 
 
 While population is densest in the high potential areas of the central plateau (Bie, 
Huambo, Kuanza Norte, Malange, Uige and parts of Benguela and Kuanza Norte), there 
are large sparsely populated areas, especially in the east, which are capable of supporting 
much larger populations than at the present time.   
 
 Staple crops range from cassava in the humid north and northeast to maize in the 
central highlands and sorghum/millet in the dryer southern provinces.  Potatoes are an 
important crop in the central plateau and rice is also grown over large areas in the north.  
Cattle are raised over broad areas in the central plateau but are particularly important in 
the southern provinces of Cunene, Huila, and Namibe where there are an estimated 3  
million head of cattle. 
 
 The most important cash crop has historically been coffee, which grows well in 
the highlands from Uige and Malange through Cuanza Norte and as far south as Huambo 
and Bie.  Exports are currently negligible due to the war, though Angola was once the 
world's third largest exporter.  Cotton, sugar cane, sisal, bananas and wood are other 
important cash crops, though production is very low by historical standards at the present 
time. 
 
 
III.  Current Economic Situation 
 
 
A.  Growth, Inflation and Exchange Rate 
 
 Growth in GDP over the past 10 years (See Table 1)  has been anemic at best, and 
negative in many years.  Only when oil prices and/or production rise does growth rise as 
well, reflecting the extreme oil dependence of the Angolan economy.  This situation was 
in fact almost inevitable over the many years of conflict, when production in rural areas 
was virtually impossible.  Now that hostilities have ended, growth in non-oil sectors has 
slowly started to rebound but oil remains dominant.  Recent oil price increases to more 
than $40 per barrel will provide additional growth if they are sustained.3 
   
 GDP growth in 2003 was 4.3%, largely due to the performance of the oil sector.  
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This growth rate is forecast to increase to more than 12% this year and next and to go 
even higher in 2006 and beyond.  These projections rely on oil production estimates and 
as such are contingent upon the state of the world oil market.  While physical production 
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Table 1  ANGOLA:  Gross Domestic Product, 1997-2002 (annual rate of change) 
       
       1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
       
 Annual Rate of Change 
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
 
      
      
         
      
      
      
       
       
       
     
      
      
      
      
     
      
      
      
       
     
       
      
      
10.2 5.2 1.3 9.3 18.0 12.1
Mining 6.5 8.1 4.7 2.0 1.8 22.0
Crude and Gas
 
4.7 3.5 1.0 0.4 (1.0) 25.0
Other 53.4 90.2 39.5 13.3 19.5 6.6
Manufacturing Industries 9.3 4.9 7.1 8.9 9.8 10.1
Electricity Industry 9.4 14.5 1.3 0.8 10.0 10.0
Construction 13.0 10.0 5.0 7.5 8.5 10.0
Trade Services 9.4 5.0 4.4 3.4 6.0 11.6
Non- Trade Services 5.5 0.0 (7.5) 1.5 1.0 2.5
Impor customs duties 5.0 (30.0) (10.0) 0.0 2.5 5.0
GDP at Market Prices 
 
7.7 5.5 2.7 3.6 5.2 15.5
 Index (1992=100) 
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
 
89.2 93.9 95.1 104.0 122.6 137.5
Mining 127.6 137.9 144.4 147.2 149.9 182.9
Crude and Gas 
 
129.4 133.9 135.3 135.8 134.4 168.0
Other 102.4 194.8 271.7 307.8 367.8 392.0
Manufacturing Industries 103.0 108.1 115.8 126.0 138.4 152.4
Electricity Industry 116.6 133.4 135.2 136.3 149.9 164.9
Construction 89.1 98.1 103.0 110.7 120.1 132.1
Trade Services 101.9 107.0 111.6 115.4 122.3 136.5
Non- Trade Services 71.3 71.3 66.0 67.0 67.6 69.3
Import customs duties 53.9 37.8 34.0 34.0 34.8 36.6
GDP at Market Prices 102.2 107.8 110.7 114.7 120.8 139.5
Source:  Banco Nacional de Angola.     
 
estimates can be made with some level of confidence, world oil prices are, of course, 
dependent upon a host of factors well beyond the control of Angola.  Outside of oil, it is 
also reasonable to expect higher growth rates in agriculture and elsewhere as the process 
of rehabilitation and reactivations continues.4 
 
 From independence in 1975 until the past few years Angola went through a series 
of hyperinflationary episodes followed by stabilization/control policy packages and then 
renewed inflation.  The root cause of these cycles was monetization of fiscal deficits.   
Spending fueled by oil receipts would be unsustainable after a period of growth, with 
declining oil receipts from either production declines or adverse price movements often 
triggering the need to print money, or to borrow against future oil receipts. 
 
 Relations with international organizations were uneven through these episodes, as 
the government proved unable to adhere to the terms required by the IMF for approval.  
However, over the past year the government has shown a renewed determination to 
achieve stability and to do whatever is necessary to normalize relations with the IMF, the 
World Bank, and other donors.  Recent announcements regarding oil-related receipts are 
a break with the past and could, if continued and extended sector-wide, provide the basis 
for a sustained move to a more transparent mode of operation.5 
 
 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the exchange rate over the past five years.  Of 
particular interest is the clear change in the trend as of August 2003 where the effects of 
government activity in the foreign exchange market can be seen in the stabilization and 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate through the last five months of 2003 through 
the present.  For virtually all of the 1990's, the official exchange rate was substantially 
overvalued, with the parallel market premium reaching levels well above 1000% at times.  
This is one area where the government has been very successful since the year 2000, with 
the parallel premium usually less than 1%.  The Kwanza has stabilized at a level of 
around 80 to the US Dollar for the past year, but it should be noted that this is a period of 
substantial dollar depreciation vis a vis the Euro, so that the Kwanza has in reality been 
depreciating somewhat on a trade weighted basis.  In spite of this, the Balance of 
Payments is unlikely to respond to any great degree since virtually all exports are 
composed of oil and imports are as yet quite price unresponsive, given the lack of 
domestic substitutes for many of the imports to coastal cities.6    
        
 Table 2 shows the evolution of the Balance of Payments in recent years.  It can be 
seen that there has been a sizable deficit on the current account in every year except 
2000, which was a peak in the oil market.  While the trade balance is strongly positive in 
all years, the negative balance on the services account more than makes up for this 
difference.  It is also evident that foreign loans account for a large share of the flows 
recorded in the balance of payments, including large interest payments in the current 
account. Figures 3 and 4 show the composition of exports in recent years, when the 
overwhelming dominance of oil is clear. 
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Figure 2 
 
Angola -  Nominal Exchange Rate vs. US Dollar
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Table 2.  ANGOLA:  Balance of Payments, 1998-2002 
(in millions of dollars; unless otherwise stated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Prel. 
 
Current account -1,867
 
-1,710
 
796 
 
-1,431 -644
 
Trade balance 1,464
 
2,047
 
4,881 
 
3,355 4,649
  Exports, f.o.b. 3,543 5,157 7,921 6,534 8,359
     Oil sector 3,091 4,491 7,120 5,803 7,677
     Diamonds 432 629 739 689 638
     Other 20 37 62 43 44
  Imports, f.o.b. -2,079 -3,109 -3,040 -3,179 -3,709
Services (net) -2,514 -2,442 -2,432 -3,316 -3,856
  Receipts 122 153 267 203 230
  Payments -2,635 -2,595 -2,699 -3,518 -4,086
Income (net) -969 -1,372 -1,681 -1,561 -1,527
  Of which: Interest due 1/ -504 -569 -597 -539 -393
Current transfers (net) 152 56 28 91 89
 
Financial and capital account 
 
 
304
 
1,664
 
-450 
 
954 
 
-13
Capital transfers (net) 8 7 18 4 23
Direct investments (net) 1,114 2,472 879 2,146 1,312
  Of which: Oil bonuses 51 935 0 450 0
Medium- and long-term loans -974 -291 -766 -618 -831
  Disbursements 593 1,501 1,610 1,619 1,048
  Amortizations -1,567 -1,791 -2,376 -2,237 -1,879
Other Capital (net) 156 -524 -580 -577 -518
      
Net errors and omissions 377 -80 -51 -365 0
      
Overall balance -1,186 -126 295 -842 -658
      
Net international reserves (- increase) 319 -530 -631 508 207
Exceptional financing 868 656 336 334 451
  Debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness 68 0 202 40 16
  Arrears, net (+ increase) 1/ 800 656 134 294 435
 
 
B.  Agricultural Production 
 
 Figures 5 and 6 show areas planted and tonnage produced by province for the 
most recent crop year for which data are available.  The regional variation in production 
is immediately clear, with three distinct zones.  The central highlands are primarily a 
maize based area, the north is based mostly on cassava, while the dryer southern 
provinces produce mainly sorghum and millet.  Livestock production is also important in 
these southern provinces. 
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                                              Figure 3:  Oil and Non-Oil Exports 
Composition of Angolan Exports
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 As can be seen in the food balance sheet in Table 3, the country is still well short 
of producing what it needs in terms of basic calories per capita.  This is mainly a result of 
the persistent effects of the dislocation caused by the war, with many farm families 
having yet to regain levels of production that would allow them to feed themselves 
adequately, much less produce a surplus for the market.  Figure 7 shows area planted 
together with production over the past several years in Huambo.  The steady upward 
trend in area planted is clear, while the oscillations around the trend in terms of 
production are largely due to variations in rainfall.  
 
 Table 4 shows average Angolan yields together with the average yields for Sub 
Saharan Africa.  It is immediately obvious that yields are very low, even compared to 
other countries in Sub Saharan Africa.  This implies that there is substantial room for 
improvement – indeed, a doubling of yields would still leave Angola in the lower ranks 
of the range of yields found in other countries. 
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Figure 4:  Composition of Exports – Average 2001 – 2002 
Oil-Derived 
Products
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Source: Banco Nacional de Angola.
 
 
 Agricultural exports are at a near zero level, as they have been for many years due 
to the civil conflict.  However, Angola has a long history of pre-independence 
agricultural exports, having once been a major coffee exporter.  Maize was also a major 
export in the 1970’s, amounting to more than 400,000 MT in its peak year, almost all of 
which was produced by smallholders. 
 
 
C.  Infrastructure 
 
 It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of infrastructure 
constraints, particularly transport, for Angolan rural development.  If producers are to 
move beyond subsistence they will need adequate physical connections to markets, and 
these are lacking or in extremely poor condition through much of the country.  
Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate that the Bank and other donors give priority to 
rehabilitating the principal transportation routes. 
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Figure 5:  Area Planted by Commodity and Province 2002-2003 
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Figure 6:  Tonnage by Commodity and Province, 2002-2003 
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 Table 3:  Angola Food Balance Sheet 
 
Cereals (tons) Other products (tons) 
Crop Year 2002-2003, 
Marketing Year 2003-
2004 Maize 
Millet/ 
Sorghum Rice .1.1 Wheat Total cereals Beans Goundnuts 
Cassava 
(fresh prod.) 
Potatoes/ 
Sweet 
potatoes 
A.  Total availability 628,684 88,090 14,831       5,000 736,605 234,408 60,849 6,647,758 817,524
A.1.  Initial stocks 10,000 5,000        4,000 5,000 24,000 2,000 2,000 20,000 5,000
        Commercial sector          4,000 0 4,000 5,000 13,000 1,000 1,000 0 0
        Producer stocks 6,000         5,000 0 0 11,000 1,000 1,000 20,000 5,000
A.2.  Total production 
        (2002-2003) 618,684 83,090        10,831 0 712,605 232,408 58,849 6,627,758 812,524
B.  Utilization 717,360 200,419 243,827 225,225     1,386,830 320,792 67,567 3,082,992 830,156
B.1.  Human 
consumption    641,496 186,343 239,059 213,225 1,280,123 302,922 61,059 1,339,952 703,228
B.2.  Other uses 65,864 9,076 768      0 75,707 15,870 4,508 1,723,040 121,928
        Seed 16,369 2,429 551 0 19,349 10,263 4,508 0 29,760 
        Feed 6,187 2,493  0 8,680 0 0 689,216 27,166 
        Losses 43,308 4,155        217 0 47,679 5,607 2,354 1,033,824 65,002
B.3.  Final stocks 10,000 5,000 4,000       12,000 31,000 2,000 2,000 20,000 5,000
C.  Imports 88,676 112,328 228,996       220,225 650,225 86,384 6,718 12,633
      Surplus        3,564,776  
D.  Exports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Deficit 88 44 6.1 2.2 53 73 90 216 98 
Source:  MINADER. 
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Figure 7:  Maize Production in Huambo 
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Source:  FEWS NET 
 
 
Table 4: 
Comparative Yields for Key Crops, 2003 
Crop 
African 
Developing  
(Kg/ha) 
Angola 
(Kg/ha) 
Comparative 
Performance  
Maize 1,423 554 39% 
Cassava 8,835 8,852 100% 
Millet 703 355 51% 
Groundnut 855 349 41% 
Beans (dry) 608 224 37% 
Coffee (green) 448 19 4% 
Source: FAOSTAT April 2004 
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 Even given the major road building envisioned in the soon to be initiated EMRP 
project, there will remain substantial work to be done in the context of an agricultural 
project on tertiary roads and small bridges.  These are essential to reconnecting isolated 
villages to their local markets and the national market beyond.  Some of these needs can 
be addressed within a FAS style project involving local participation.  Such approaches 
are often useful when there is a single bottleneck such as a missing bridge preventing 
communication and transport.  However, longer or heavier rehabilitation needs will 
require a dedicated feeder road component in a general rural development project. 
 
 In terms of marketing infrastructure, it should be noted that much of this is not 
best funded by the government.  However, there are some areas where government action 
or reform can be beneficial.  In particular there is a lack of municipal and urban market 
spaces in many parts of the country (simple paved and roofed areas) which can serve as a 
focal point for trade.  At the village level, promotion of communal storage facilities 
(perhaps through the FAS) could help smallholders to take advantage of seasonal and/or 
regional variations in price or availability. 
 
 
IV.  The Policy and Institutional Context for Agriculture 
 
 
A.  Real Exchange Rate 
 
 Figure 8 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate over the past ten years, 
calculated on the basis of the Banco Nacional de Angola’s reported informal market 
exchange rate against the US Dollar.  The respective CPI’s for each country are used to 
generate the real exchange rate.  It should be noted that the choice of a base year (in this 
case January of 2001) is inevitably arbitrary.  This is particularly so in Angola, where 
there is no point in the recent past which can be regarded as “normal” or “stable”.  
Regardless of the base year, it is obvious that the period since the beginning of 2001 has 
been one of continued and large appreciation. 
 
 With the nominal rate stable or appreciating over the past year, and with inflation 
recorded at 76%, there has been a huge real appreciation just in the past 12 months.  This 
has not been a conscious policy objective of the government.  Rather, it is a result of the 
combination of policies in which the policy target is the rate of inflation, and the tool 
used to get there in the face of large fiscal deficits is the use of large quantities of foreign 
exchange for financing as discussed above. 
 
 This result is typical of oil economies and one which will be a major disaster for 
the agricultural sector if it continues.  Every farmer wishing to produce maize for the 
coastal urban market has been effectively taxed over the past year by the real 
appreciation.  Casual evidence indicates that they may not be competitive with imports at 
current exchange rates, but enjoy some de facto protection in the interior due to the 
extremely poor roads.   However, this will change if inflation continues while the 
exchange rate remains stable.  This makes it clear that if some degree of appreciation is  
 16 
 
 
Figure 8 
  Angola -  Real Exchange Rate Index vs. US Dollar
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inevitable, then reducing unit costs for farmers is key for their viability as producers of 
marketed surplus.  Failing this, the only way to prevent widespread depression in the 
agricultural sector is some form of protection from imports. 
 
 While it is in no way productive to suggest measures such as the Nigerian rice 
import ban, it must be recognized that pressures for policies of this type will grow if 
appreciation continues.  In fact, the Nigerian case is quite relevant since the rapid decline 
of the agricultural sector, and the consequent migration of people out of the sector and the 
countryside fueled problems and social costs which Angola would do well to avoid if 
possible. 
 
 The Nigeria case has been exhaustively studied both within the World Bank and 
outside of it.  Major studies include those by Gelb et. al., Lele et al. in the 1980’s and 
Schiff and Valdes in the 1990’s, which document the evolution of the real exchange rate 
and its effects on agricultural production in the interior of the country.  Due to 
competition from artificially cheap food imports made possible by real exchange rate 
appreciation it became possible for producers in the major agricultural regions to buy 
imported food at the farmgate at prices below their own costs of production.  The result 
was a collapse in domestic production and  a conversion of what had been Africa’s 
largest agricultural exporter into its largest importer. 
 
 
Competitiveness of Imported Maize in Angolan Provinces 
 
 Though it would be desirable to conduct a full Domestic Resource Cost analysis 
of crops in Angola, there is no current basis for performing one given the complete lack 
of cost of production studies at the farm level.  However, some indication of the 
competitiveness of Angolan production vis a vis imports can be gained from comparing 
world prices with domestic prices adjusted by appropriate transport costs. 
 
 Figure 9 shows “off truck” prices for maize prices collected in several points 
within Angola in March and April of 2004.  These data correspond to the price of maize 
(adjusted to a metric ton basis from the 50 kg sack maize is typically marketed in) at the 
point of sale in markets where small traders take trucks after they have filled them with 
product purchased from smallholders.  The figures for Luanda and Benguela are from 
markets on the outskirts of the city, while those for the other provinces are averages of 
prices in outlying municipalities. 
 
 International prices for maize loaded at US Gulf ports earlier this year averaged 
approximately $115/MT7.  If we assume an average cost of $47.50/MT for cargo, 
insurance and freight (c.i.f.) costs from that point to Angolan ports8 and add  a $20/MT 
estimate for port costs, including the 2% import tariff charged on grains, handling, and 
bagging, we arrive at an ex-port price of approximately $184/MT.   
 
 Comparing this price to those in the various provinces, we can immediately see 
that grain imports are competitive in the port cities of Benguela and Luanda.  However, 
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the comparison in interior cities depends upon the trucking costs from the relevant port 
(Luanda, Lobito or Namibe) to the city in question.  Table 5 shows trucking rates 
contracted by the WFP with the private sector to various destinations.  It is clear that 
imports are not yet competitive in other provincial cities, though Huambo is relatively 
close, with a cost of imported grain delivered in Huambo of approximately $244/MT.9  
This is only a little more than $50 above the local “off-truck” price. 
 
 These trucking costs can be expected to fall as roads are improved and reliably 
demined.10  Indeed, a large road building project to do just that is scheduled to begin in 
September, while the Lobito/Huambo railroad is currently being rehabilitated and will cut  
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Figure 9:  “Off-Truck” Maize Prices, April 2004 
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Table 5:  Cost of Grain Transport from Ports to Interior Cities – 2003/2004 
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freight costs drastically when it is completed.  What these will be is hard to determine at 
this point, but it is safe to say that a secure, risk free rail connection to the coast will 
greatly reduce the margin reported above.  To take one example, if the railroad were to 
halve the cost of transport from the coast to Huambo, the margin reported above would 
be reduced to only $20. 
 
 Running the calculation in reverse, it is apparent that Huambo is not competitive 
with imports for supplying Luanda at the present time.  With a trucking cost of $110/MT 
between these two cities, imports at $184/MT are far cheaper than maize from Huambo at 
approximately $300.  However, as noted in the previous paragraph, improved roads will 
greatly reduce this cost in the near future.  In addition, it may be that the informal market 
is somewhat cheaper than the formally negotiated trucking rates cited here. 
 
 Equally important, a continued appreciation of the real exchange rate will have a 
similarly great effect on the comparison.  Continued domestic inflation with a constant 
traded goods price due to the artificially supported exchange rate could make imported 
grain competitive in the interior at some future point.  In coastal areas this is already the 
case, as noted above.  In summary, the dangers of continued appreciation of the real 
exchange rate are real, and have the potential to affect grain markets throughout the 
country. 
 
 
B.  Fuel Subsidies 
 
 The recent increases in fuel prices and the long term intention to eliminate what 
are at the moment very large subsidies to fuel will have an impact on agriculture.  
Though most smallholders do not use motorized machinery at the farm level and so will 
not be directly affected by this, they will be at some time in the future and larger 
commercial farmers will now.  Perhaps more important for smallholders is the effect this 
will have on marketing costs, since most transport is done in trucks.  The current price of 
fuel, at 20 KZ/liter is extremely low though it was recently more than doubled.  At an 
current exchange rates, this translates to approximately $0.25 US per liter, still a very low 
price. 
 
 
C.  Current Government Sector Policy on Agriculture and Rural Development11 
 
 Few explicit policies are currently stated with respect to the agricultural sector. In 
addition, some policies appear contradictory, emphasizing the absence of an overall 
policy framework beyond that of the Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza  (ECP), in which  
a number of policy issues are addressed. Of the ten key goals put forward in the 
document,  one is specific to the sector, calling for: 
“Minimize the risk of hunger, satisfy domestic food needs and relaunch the rural 
economy as a vital sector in the process of sustainable development.” 
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 This goal is subsequently broken down into four specific objectives, as follows: 
Reinforce the production capacity of the traditional agricultural sector, 
particularly with respect to basic foodstuffs and in-shore and artesanal fishing; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Reactivate internal marketing systems; 
Ensure the sustainable development of natural resources; 
Reorganize and strengthen the legal framework and gradually modernize 
public institutions, converting them into agents of supervision and promotion 
of sustainable development. 
 
 These objectives are then broken down into specific production targets and goals 
for expansion of government services. The ECP further stresses the participation of 
communities, local areas and municipalities as the strategic nucleus of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and oversight as a basic principle of development.  
 Other major goals apply indirectly to the rural sector, including : 
− Support the return and resettlement of displaced populations, refugees and 
demobilized combatants to their places of origin or resettlement zones, 
integrating them in a sustainable manner in the economic and social life of 
the area; 
− Guarantee minimum physical security conditions for citizens through 
demining, disarmament and the guarantee of law and order throughout the 
national territory. 
 
 Interviews with officials of MINADER, including the Minister, have highlighted 
the following policy elements: 
the focus of agricultural support will be on the rehabilitation of basic foodstuff 
production and surpluses among traditional smallholder farmers. The commercial 
sector, although important, is of secondary importance and better able to find its 
own resources; 
agricultural production must not be seen in isolation, but should be linked with 
other areas of rural life, including non-agricultural economic activity;  
Government support to the sector will draw largely upon collaboration with 
producer and community groups – cooperatives and associations; 
there is a strong need to develop human resource capacities, with a focus on those 
working at the field level, such as technical experts and extension staff; 
rural financial systems are critical, and must receive priority in development – 
possibly using ‘in-kind’ exchanges; 
marketing system development should initially focus on ensuring the flow of 
surpluses to demand areas and the creation of income for peasant farmers; 
the rehabilitation of the rural road network is essential for restoring access for 
service provision and marketing; 
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• 
• 
• 
land tenure issues are important, but are best resolved – where possible – at local 
level through community and local authority participation; 
irrigation development should be focused at local level, and primarily emphasize 
small-scale systems within the reach of local communities; 
geographical priority would be given to the central ‘planalto’ region, as it 
possesses a high production potential and population density. 
 
 Despite these policies, however, it should be noted that the bulk of current and 
programmed investment under MINADER comprises the rehabilitation of large scale 
Government irrigation schemes, for eventual hand-over to those occupying the land 
within the command area12. Limited investment has also occurred or been programmed 
for rehabilitation of Government facilities (research stations, offices). 
 Much of the loan funds so far obtained by MINADER have been dedicated to 
irrigation. Technical concerns have not been entirely resolved; however, it is not 
apparent that even if successful in restoring water supplies, such investment will be 
either economically viable, or will be of benefit to more than a small number of farm 
households. Disputes have already arisen in several schemes as a result of the lack of 
clear ownership or possession rights associated with properties receiving water, with 
rehabilitation work sometimes resulting in the emergence of new claimants to the land.  
 The high proportion of capital expenditure allocated to these schemes contrasts 
with the Minister’s declaration concerning the importance of small-scale locally 
managed irrigation and water control measures and will have to be resolved.  Allocation 
of expenditures as well as existing externally funded projects are enumerated in Annexes 
1 and 6.  Current investment incentives as well as import duties and taxes applicable to 
agricultural goods are enumerated in Annexes 4 and 5. 
 
1.  The Role of the Government in Rural Development in a Liberalized Economy 
 
 Discussions of the role of the government vis a vis the private sector are well in 
the past in many (if not most) African countries but are of immediate importance in 
Angola at the present time.  Though Angola has been independent for almost 25 years, 
the government has not had free access to much of the countryside for most of that 
period.  That meant that the command-economy structures of the late seventies and early 
eighties still have not been completely eliminated, and could potentially be re-established 
in the countryside as resettlement and rehabilitation proceeds. 
 
 Perhaps even more important is the persistent control oriented outlook of some in 
the government.  This is manifested in a lack of understanding of how a liberalized 
agricultural sector operates or of what the government can do to support it.  It is obvious 
that  the message has been clear to most in the government that free market economics 
are the policy of the government, but there is at times little understanding of what that 
actually means in terms of day to day operations.13 
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2. Parastatals and Direct Government Involvement in Production 
 
 First and foremost, it should be affirmed in the strongest terms that the 
government will not engage in production or marketing activities.  While the government 
has divested itself of many of its large state run operations, there is still a tendency to 
look to the government for things which in the past were done by parastatal 
organizations.  Perhaps the most obvious of these is the state agricultural machinery 
company, MECANAGRO, (formerly known as ENAMA) which is even now re-
extending itself into rural areas after decades of virtual total absence and cessation of any 
farm activities.  A recent news report stated that this parastatal had plans to buy tractors 
to “cover the entire country”.14   
 
 Reports from the central provinces indicate that it has a poor record in terms of 
timeliness of  services, but that there are bureaucratic inhibitions to the private 
importation of farm equipment.  This is entirely in line with past experience in Angola 
with ENAMA and is also in line with numerous examples around the world of poor 
performance of such organizations.  Recently, MECANAGRO has also started to offer 
subsidized sales of seed and other inputs, undercutting possible private sector 
development.   A standard rule of thumb would be that the government would not be 
responsible for any activities inside the farm-gate, nor would it be responsible for any 
marketing services on the input or output side.  However, they would focus on 
infrastructure or other investments with public good attributes such as road building.  
Indeed, this is perhaps the single biggest need at the present time, and one which could, if 
allowed, swallow the entire budget available for public investment. 
 
 There is a feeling in some quarters in Angola that it is the responsibility of the 
State to provide needed services in rural areas because the private sector hasn’t done so.  
It is extremely important at this critical juncture, NOT to try to reactivate the old 
parastatal systems since it is precisely these entities that will prevent the emergence of a 
viable private sector.  One key observation is worth recognizing - Though those who 
support reactivation of parastatal companies maintain that it is the State’s responsibility 
to see that the needed inputs and services are provided, these companies have NEVER 
succeeded in doing their assigned job for the vast majority of farmers. Simply replicating 
the old parastatals under new management is unlikely to change this record for the better. 
 
 This is particularly relevant in the area of fertilizer.  The state company designed 
to provide fertilizer supply, DINAMA, was one of the most inefficient and ineffective 
parastatals that existed.  Reestablishing it would therefore be a serious mistake.  
Currently, subsidized distribution of fertilizer is an obstacle to private sector 
development, though smallholders rarely benefit from it.  Given the need for fertilizers in 
the central highlands, a strategy to address this issue will be important.  Elaborated below 
in this report, there is a distinct role for government in overcoming market failures that 
impede the development of private sector suppliers.  Accordingly, to say that the 
government will “stay out of marketing and distribution activities” does not mean that 
there is no role for the government in promoting the development of this sector.  Indeed, 
as noted below, the failure of the private sector to step into this area in Angola and 
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elsewhere in Africa is evidence of the need for an approach which takes into account the 
market imperfections that prevent the desired development. 
 
 
3.  Government Policy in Marketing and Distribution 
 
 In the area of marketing and distribution the government has long ago ceased to 
set prices centrally, but is still in the business of setting wholesale and retail margins.  
These regulations are stated as limits of 25% on each of three market levels: producer or 
importer to wholesaler, wholesaler to retailer, and retailer to consumer.  Though these 
laws are only sporadically enforced, they remain a distinct barrier to progress in the area 
of marketing.  Justified in the Ministry of Commerce as necessary to control price 
gouging, there is no apparent recognition of the damaging effects they can have on the 
growth of rural marketing services.  Abolition of these controls, and reform of the 
Economic Police who enforce them, will be necessary at some point. 
 
 At the present time, with inflation of more than 70% during the past year (the 
lowest annual rate in more than a decade) a margin of 25% is in fact a money-losing 
proposition.  This is particularly evident when it is recognized that inflation does not 
occur smoothly - that is to say, prices underwent several periods of rapid increase 
interspersed with periods of relative stability through 2003.  A trader has no way to know 
if a margin of 25% represents positive or negative profits even over a period as short as a 
few months. 
 
 The standard prescription for exploitative marketing and trading (if it is 
occurring) is some combination of two strategies.  One is to promote the entry of more 
traders into the market to provide competition.  The other is to provide farmers with some 
measure of countervailing power through the development of producer associations.  
Government controls have demonstrated in Angola and in many other countries that they 
result in a poorly developed trading network and poorly serviced farmers.  
 
 Angola has a confederation of producer associations and traders concentrating 
mainly on maize and other crops commonly grown in the maize based cropping system.  
This organization,  Epungu, operates in the central highlands and though it was created 
by the government it does seem to have some degree of independence as it is self-
financing.  Contrary to a traditional marketing board, Epungu does not have a monopoly; 
rather, producers pay a periodic fee for the right to market through Epungu.   
 
 Given Epungu’s ownership of various grain silos in the planalto, and linkages 
with some institutional grain purchasers such as the military, it appears to have a viable 
business plan for marketing maize and beans from the planalto.    However, its still vague 
relationship with the government (Epungu reports that its official contact point is INCER, 
the Instituto de Cereais) needs to be made much clearer if the necessary independence for 
it to operate effectively as a truly farmer-run organization is to be achieved.  At present, it 
seems better to allow Epungu, as do other marketing entities, compete for financing on an 
equal basis with other ventures.  This is likely to prove a constraint given the extremely 
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degraded condition of its silos and warehouses. 
 
 Advantages of Epungu are that it is now the owner of the formerly government-
owned system of silos and warehouses in the planalto.  In addition, its capacity for self 
finance (though small as yet) and its voluntary nature are attractive.  On the other hand, 
its self financing character is at the same time a weakness given the huge expense 
involved in rehabilitating its infrastructure.  In fact, the poor state of its facilities is a 
major problem for which there is no quick solution.  Perhaps the biggest weakness of 
Epungu is its still somewhat blurry relationship with the government.  Though nominally 
independent, it is clearly government sanctioned and to the extent that government links 
remain, it is susceptible to political influence. 
 
 Other associations, such as AAPCIL in Huila, are entirely independent of the 
government but are also less capitalized than Epungu, which owns much of the existing 
infrastructure in the central zone related to grain storage.  Nevertheless, given its 
inclusion of small and medium traders, it is a potentially useful tool for promotion of 
marketing services and education and support of small traders. 
 
 Producer associations have the potential to provide smallholders with a 
countervailing market power to that of traders, but this benefit will be rendered nil if the 
government uses the organizations as a channel for the implementation of pricing 
policies.  Therefore, it is important that their formation be done at the micro level, 
without government intervention.  NGO’s such as CLUSA have substantial experience in 
doing this type of work, and have a demonstrated track record of success in Angola and 
other countries. 
 
 In terms of distribution, the government marketing boards are no longer 
functioning, having been replaced during the long years of conflict by food distribution 
directed by the World Food Program.  During this long period there was little opportunity 
for private sector development in marketing since many districts where literally 
inaccessible for years at a time.  Indeed, many remain so to this day though various 
trucking firms have sprung up as access to the interior has been restored.  To date there 
has been no government activity in the area of agricultural marketing boards until the 
creation of a semi-autonomous unit in MINADER,  the Instituto Nacional de Cereais 
(INCER) which was created with the intention of replicating the role of the old Instituto 
de Cereais de Angola (ICA), the colonial era grain marketing board.  In existence for nine 
years, INCER has not actually performed any of these functions, first because most grain 
producing regions were inaccessible and roads impassable, and more recently because of 
lack of funds.   
 
 It would be difficult to overemphasize what a bad policy it would be for the 
government to actually reenter the grain market to attempt to stabilize prices by buying 
and selling marketed output.  The examples of numerous other countries in Africa and 
elsewhere have demonstrated the abysmal performance of agricultural sectors when 
marketing is subject to government intervention of this kind.  INCER remains the owner 
of various warehouses in varying states of disrepair in grain producing zones and along 
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transport routes.  The example of Mozambique is useful in this regard, where the 
government grain board rented or sold such facilities to the private sector in order to 
promote private sector marketing development. 
 
 
4.  Land Policy and Farm Size 
 
 Of fundamental importance to the development of the agricultural sector are the 
issues of land tenure and farm size.  While these are separate issues, they are related and 
important ones in the overall vision of the sector.  The legal framework surrounding land 
tenure is somewhat unclear (as is the legal framework in other areas affecting 
agriculture).  A new land law has been written, but has yet to be approved nor have 
implementing regulations been developed. 
 
 Freehold tenure is not possible for Angolan smallholders under current law.  
Small farmers may have usufruct rights to land for a period of 45 years and can renew 
this title once for a total of 90 years.  It is also within the power of the authorities to grant 
land concessions to private citizens, and they have done this in some instances, granting 
title to former large holdings to particular individuals. This has in fact occurred on what 
is reported to be a widespread basis, though no comprehensive information is available. 
 These legal issues have little relevance for small farmers not directly displaced by 
large grants - Officially recognized tenure of any kind is virtually non-existent for small 
family farmers, rather, local traditional authorities, called sobas, allocate land among 
families in a particular area.  The legitimacy of this in the eyes of smallholders depends 
to a great deal on the legitimacy of the sobas since some are in their position by virtue of 
traditional processes while others have been installed by the government and are viewed 
as outsiders.  But official registration is rare even for larger landholders, given the 
intricacies of procedures and the weakness of supporting bureaucratic structures. 
 
 In many cases, dislocated families who have resettled in rural areas know which 
exact plot of land they once had and are returning to this same place.  Often, this is well 
recognized by all in a particular area.  More difficult are cases where new families settle 
in a particular area either because of relocation or population growth.  Given an estimated 
growth in the population of somewhere in the neighborhood of 3% per year, there are 
now twice as many Angolans as there were 25 years ago.  Even with today’s higher 
levels of urbanization, there will inevitably be greater land pressure today than in the 
past,  particularly in the most densely populated zones. 
 
 The various studies of land registration and cadastre performed by the FAO study 
and subsequently report extreme weakness in technical terms in the ability to manage a 
land registration system at both the central and provincial levels.15  Accordingly, 
technical assistance in the necessary mapping and registration systems together with 
assistance in the participatory approaches necessary to ensure respect of the rights of all 
stakeholders are an important part of any initiative in the area of land tenure and titling. 
 
 It is somewhat premature to propose launching a nation-wide campaign of land 
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titling given the rudimentary state of land registries and the fact that the laws themselves 
are in flux.  However, there is much to recommend ensuring that the rights of 
smallholders are respected in areas where higher levels of government seek to grant 
concessions to large private owners.  In many cases, population growth has resulted in 
colonial era plantations being wholly or partly occupied by family farmers, while shifting 
cultivation systems in other areas make definition of holdings more difficult.  At a 
minimum, pilot efforts at titling smallholders can be initiated in areas with the most 
pressure on land, or where large concessions threaten the rights of small farmers. 
 
 Currently, the FAO is implementing a project that does just this.  Accordingly, the 
best policy for the Bank and other donors is to regard this intiative as a pilot project.  
Pending evaluation and lessons learned from this effort, the project could be expanded to 
additional parts of the country. 
 
 The current system of usufruct tenure falls short of what most economists would 
recommend in support of a well functioning land market, but it is important not to let a 
quest for a “better” land law get in the way of ensuring that smallholder needs are 
recognized and respected.  Of prime importance in areas of potential conflict or pressure 
is that these rights be recognized - even if only for 90 years.  Once “facts on the ground” 
are created through occupation for a period of time this long, it is far less likely that rights 
can then be taken away.  It should also be noted that many of the benefits commonly 
associated with freehold tenure, e.g. the ability to mortgage land, will not be available in 
any case due to other problems, in this case the near total lack of a rural financial market. 
 
 In fact, there are widespread reports of large land appropriations by politically 
connected parties that are done in a less than transparent process, given the current status 
of the land registration and titling system.  It goes without saying that such activities, if 
true, ought to be halted, and it is in the interest of all to create a more transparent system 
capable of being monitored by all interested parties.  Indeed, the current movement 
toward more transparency should be extended to land administration as soon as possible. 
 
 
Farm Size and Government Choices 
 
 A general strategy of promoting a conducive market environment for agriculture 
is one which in most ways is equally supportive of both large and small farms.  Clearly, 
all farms need basic infrastructure and all require a market friendly regulatory 
environment.  This strategy assumes and encourages a vision of the Angolan agricultural 
sector in the future which includes a mix of both large and small farms all of which are 
increasingly oriented toward production for the market.  However, even such an 
evenhanded (with respect to farm size) vision does not obviate the need for the 
government to make choices as to which subsectors of agriculture to invest in. 
 
 MINADER has demonstrated a preference for large scale mechanized farming 
with its choice of investments, allocating them to large irrigation schemes and tractor 
purchases.  This is line with ministry preferences for many years, and is perhaps 
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reflective of both colonial experience prior to 1975 and the years of socialist-inspired 
command economics thereafter. 
 
 Angola shares with other former Portuguese colonies a history of two distinct 
types of farms - commercial and family.  In colonial times this distinction largely fell 
along racial lines, but with independence large holdings reverted to state ownership.  
There, most of them languished, since state capacity for management was limited and the 
ongoing civil conflict rendered attempts at agricultural production impossible. 
 
 Now that reactivation is possible there is a strong tendency among some to want 
to reactivate the former large farm sector through government support for mechanized 
operations, infrastructure and other assistance.  While growth of large farms is not 
something that needs to be prohibited or discouraged, there are some very good reasons 
not to go down the path of replicating in neo-colonialist fashion the agricultural sector of 
the colonial era. 
 
 First, the example of Zimbabwe should give pause to anyone recommending such 
a course.  It would be mistaken to view the Zimbabwean disaster as stemming solely 
from the difference in color of the large farmers and the disadvantaged family sector.  
Rather, the political tensions and economic meltdown caused by the promotion of large 
capital intensive farms at the expense of help to the family sector is something that can 
easily occur in Angola if the same development path is pursued.  While the fact that 
Zimbabwean large farmers are mostly white may make a viable political reason for 
dispossessing them, the family sector in Angola would be no less unhappy were the 
favored few of African rather than European ancestry. 
 
 Second, though large mechanized farms are in some ways an easier path to quick 
output increases, they do not promote rural development if they operate as an enclave 
excluding the masses of rural population who continue to live at the subsistence level.  In 
the Angolan case in particular, it is a mistake to think that smallholders cannot supply 
food to urban areas or produce for the export market.  They did both prior to 
independence (pre-independence exports of maize reached 400,000 MT/year, almost all 
produced by smallholders), and did so with a technological level not visibly different 
from that in use today.  This means that they can not only produce for the export market 
based on their current practices, but there is substantial room for improvement as well.  It 
is also worth noting that the balance of payments is improved just as much by a dollar’s 
worth of import replacement (if farmers supply Angolan cities instead of using imports to 
do it) as it is by a dollar’s worth of exports. 
 
 Third, the experience of many other countries, including several in Africa, 
demonstrates that smallholder development, though it may take longer to bear fruit, can 
generate far higher returns per dollar invested than can investment in large capital 
intensive farms.  This is because small farmers are so capital starved that the return to 
even a small investment is likely to be very large, and also because small farmers are far 
more likely to stimulate the local economy than are large farms.  Whereas large 
mechanized operations will buy their capital goods from abroad (e.g. tractors), small 
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farmer implements and machinery can be produced locally, providing a further stimulus 
to production and to internal trade.  Promotion of such multiplier effects is one of the 
basic goals of rural development efforts, but is lost if most of the inputs are imported as is 
the case with large mechanized operations. 
 
 Fourth, a small farm development strategy is in line with Angola’s stated aims of 
poverty reduction.  The majority of Angolans reside in rural areas and the majority of 
these are poor (indeed, extremely poor by any objective measure).  A large farm 
development strategy which leaves them unaffected would do little to alleviate poverty, 
and would create political-economic issues in the future which could well make it worse. 
 
 Fifth, the desire of some to reactivate production of former colonial era export 
crops such as coffee has problems that should be seriously considered before money is 
invested in this effort.  First, world market conditions have changed substantially over the 
intervening years, with world coffee prices now so low that one of the world’s major 
producers, Viet Nam, has even decided to uproot 20% of their coffee area so that it can 
be planted to other crops.  Given the fact that Angola has no advantage over Viet Nam in 
either labor costs or climate, this should be seen as a strong warning.  In addition, the 
world market for robusta coffee, which is what Angola produces in most regions, is much 
less favorable than that for arabica. 
 
 On the issue of labor cost, conditions are very different in Angola now than they 
were in the 1970's.  Colonial era plantations could take advantage of what was essentially 
forced labor, something that is no longer the case today.  In fact, in order to assure a 
sufficient supply of sufficiently cheap labor, it would be to the advantage of coffee 
plantations to prevent development of small farms since if rural people could make a 
better living on their own land than working on a plantation, it is likely that they would 
do so.16 
 
 However, the government does have an entity, the Instituto Nacional do Café 
(INCA) which is devoted to the promotion of coffee production and rehabilitation of the 
former export capacity.  Reportedly relying on a dedicated donor project, this institute is 
unlikely, for the reasons cited above, to succeed in restoring coffee to its former place of 
importance.  Given this it is hard to justify a separate government institute in the former 
coffee regions in the long run since diversification into other crops is likely to playa 
crucial role in growth in these areas.  However, INCA’s general development efforts can 
provide a basis for future extension and development efforts in these regions. 
 
 None of this should be taken to mean that large farms should be actively 
discouraged or prohibited.  Indeed, quite the contrary since many large farmers are well 
positioned to respond quickly to market incentives while at the same time providing a 
stimulus to growth in the rural areas where they are located.  Furthermore, the hope is 
that one day, successful small farmers will grow into large, commercial ones.  The point 
is that large commercial farmers should not need government supported credit or 
subsidies in order to operate.  If they are commercially viable, then they should be able to 
access credit markets on their own.  Subsidies would only serve to promote enterprises 
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that might not be viable on their own merits.  Nevertheless, large farms can and will 
benefit from improvements in transport and marketing and in fact may well be the 
nucleus of future large scale commercial enterprises serving both large and small 
producers. 
 
 Small farms, if they are to support an adequate standard of living for farm 
families and at the same time produce a marketable surplus, are likely to have to be 
somewhere in the 5-10 ha. range, given soil and climate conditions in the planalto.  This 
size necessarily implies reliance on animal traction or some other land-using and labor 
saving technology.  Draft animals are well known in these areas, though the population 
was much reduced during the long years of conflict and dislocation.  A survey of farm 
size would provide the basic knowledge base that is lacking in this area. 
 
 
5.  Rural Credit 
 
 Rural financial systems are almost completely absent in Angola. Excluding 
Luanda, there are a total of 41 bank branches in Angola, which are confined entirely to 
provincial capitals17. While most of the coastal provinces typically have five or six banks 
with offices in the provincial capital, only the Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC) and 
the Banco de Comércio e Indústria (BCI) – both State-owned18 - have close to a national 
network. As a result, most provincial capitals in the interior tend to be served by only one 
or two banks. Commercial bank activity is limited largely to short term trading loans, 
with agriculture and livestock together accounting for US$6.3 million in loans in 2002 
(up from US$2.8 million in 2000), or approximately 1.3% of total loans. Fisheries 
received a further US$2.2 million in 2002 (0.4% of total loans).  
 
 Several Government and non-governmental agencies supplement the formal 
banking system with specific microfinance programmes, such as those operated by the 
Ministry of the Family and Promotion of Women (MINAFAMU) or the Development 
Workshop. One bank, Banco Sol is also active in microcredit, and a new bank supported 
by USAID and ChevronTexaco – Novo Banco – has now been approved and will shortly 
commence operations. Nevertheless microcredit in Angola is still very poorly developed. 
The Development Workshop, which operates the largest microcredit programme in the 
country, reaches less than 4,000 clients and has a portfolio of less than US$500,000, all in 
urban areas of Luanda and Huambo. Rural microcredit operations are almost completely 
undeveloped. The absence of legislation on microfinance has left those few agencies 
active in the area operating in a legal vacuum, and rendered the acquisition of capital 
more difficult. Negative real interest rates are a disincentive to savings mobilization in 
the medium to long term. 
 
 There is a long history around the world of failed efforts at dedicated rural credit 
programs administered through the formal sector.  There is no reason to think Angola is 
somehow unique in this regard.  On the contrary, past credit programs have suffered the 
typical problems of failing to benefit smallholders while failing minimum tests of 
repayment and sustainability.  This is certainly true of the FADA, a dedicated investment 
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fund in MINADER, which historically has not engaged in rural credit so much as grants 
and infrastructure investments.  FDES, another dedicated fund, has been linked more 
with the commercial than with the family sector.  Historically, smallholders received in-
kind credit from rural traders who knew farmers and both bought and sold agricultural 
inputs and consumption goods.  This network of fixed rural traders is unlikely, for a 
variety of reasons, to be re-established.  Accordingly, other mechanisms will be required 
if rural credit is to play a role in the reactivation of the sector.   
 
 There have been a variety of efforts to promote credit use among farmers in 
Angola, mediated by a variety of NGO’s.  As noted above, Banco Sol has been a pioneer 
in linking with some of these NGO’s in lending to small farmers.  Among the most 
important common elements of success are the following characteristics: 
 
-  Credit, where successful, has been linked to input purchase and has not been contracted 
independently.  Repayment has been contractually linked to marketing proceeds, rather 
than leaving responsibility for repayment directly with the farmers 
 
-  Successful programs have been associated with farmer associations, thus solving the 
problem of adverse selection together with economies in administrative areas. 
 
 Replication of these successful models can help promote investment and 
involvement in the market.  However, it should be recognized that rural financial market 
growth is a long term prospect even under the best of circumstances. 
 
 Credit for rural marketing enterprises and other small businesses, such as 
agricultural implement manufacture or food processing are also areas that are in need of 
financing and capital investment.  There is little hope that the formal sector will on its 
own extend credit to such enterprises.  However, there is much to recommend an 
extension of the microcredit initiatives cited above to small businesses engaged in 
marketing, transport, farm implement manufacture or food processing on a small scale. 
 
 
D.  HIV/AIDS 
 
 While current infection rates are below those found in many other southern 
African countries, it is likely that this is at least partly due to the long conflict and the 
difficulties in travel and communication that resulted.  As peace and normal circulation 
returns, it is to be expected that HIV infection rates will grow.  Indeed, one source 
reported that a study of infection rates at a maternity hospital in Lubango showed 
infection rates of 18%, far higher than has been estimated in recent years.19  The toll on 
economic growth in general and agricultural growth in particular is as yet an unknown, 
even in other African countries where the epidemic is far more advanced than in Angola.   
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However, given that the disease strikes disproportionately among prime working age 
adults, there will inevitably be a noticeable effect.   
 
 Given the proven importance of roads and transport routes as vectors for 
transmission of the disease, it is imperative that Angola twin road building and 
rehabilitation efforts with HIV education and prevention programs.  It makes no sense to 
wait until the higher infection rates manifest themselves since we know that if we rebuild 
roads, we will inevitably see them. 
 
 In addition, it is important that all extension workers have accurate HIV 
information even if they are not specifically mandated to do HIV education.  Not only are 
they the only outside contact many rural people have, but they are also in precisely the 
demographic group most likely to be both victims of and transmitters of the disease. 
 
 There is a case to be made that labor saving technologies will become more 
important as the epidemic progresses.  This may be true but it is important to realize that 
from the point of view of the smallholder, labor savings are looked at from a household 
viewpoint.  That is to say, they look at all of the labor requirements of a smallholding 
rather than just those involved with agricultural production per se.  Thus, they may decide 
that the most important area for labor saving is firewood collection, or transport rather 
than crop production.   
 
 
V. A National Vision for Agriculture 
 
 
A.  Agricultural Development, Food Security and Poverty Reduction 
 
 This study presents the elements of a strategy for agricultural development and 
has a primary focus on rural productive sectors and their  contribution to local and 
national food security.  Given the fact that a large majority of rural inhabitants are 
engaged in agriculture, and that a majority of these are among the poorest in the country, 
it is clear that these efforts will contribute to the overall national effort to reduce poverty.   
 
 As a point of departure, it is important to recognize that in a context of successful 
long term economic growth and development, the process of structural transformation has 
strong implications for the agricultural sector.   The most important fundamental change 
(given successful sustained growth in per capita income),  is that the percentage of the 
population engaged directly in farming will decrease, meaning that only a subset of 
current producers will remain in the future. 
 
 This implies three observations: 
 
Observation 1 - A strategy of focusing on agriculturally favored regions is appropriate.  It 
is in these areas of high comparative advantage that high returns to investments can be 
expected.  There is no doubt that a national strategy must encompass the whole country, 
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but this does not mean that all regions should get equal shares of available investments 
since this would unnecessarily dilute anticipated effects and would not generate positive 
results compared with a more focused alternative.  It should be noted that this is precisely 
the reasoning behind many donors’ current focus on the Planalto Central.  However, as 
noted below, a broader and longer term view of the Angolan resource base generates a 
substantially broader view of the range of viable investments in the country. 
 
Observation 2 - Even within favored zones, there will be some farms which evolve into 
viable and growing agribusinesses while others will be absorbed or fall by the wayside.  
Accordingly, those small to medium farmers or associations which show growth potential 
 merit further investment since it is these which will form the basis of the future farm 
sector.   
 
Observation 3 - For those households which will through migration or generational shifts 
leave the farm sector, it is nevertheless likely that they will remain involved in agriculture 
through cultivation of personal or family plots even as income sources become 
increasingly devoted to non-farm activities.  Accordingly, there is still an important 
economic (i.e. food security) and environmental case to be made for promoting 
sustainable low input conservation farming techniques among these populations.  
 
 As noted elsewhere in this report, there have historically been two distinct sub-
sectors in agriculture, called in colonial times the “commercial” and the “family” sectors.  
There is a strong (but not perfect) correlation between commercial farms and larger 
farms, and these typically have direct access to credit and government facilities and 
resources which smallholders do not have.  This strategy focuses on the smallholders, not 
because large commercial farms are judged to be inherently bad or inefficient, but 
because of the “public good” attributes of a smallholder oriented strategy.  Large farms 
can be, and are, developed through private sector initiatives without a large increase in 
public assistance beyond that which they currently enjoy.  Smallholders, on the other 
hand, present at the same time the largest group, that which is most in need of assistance, 
that which has the largest potential gains in terms of both productive efficiency and 
welfare, and the least ability for self-sustaining investment and growth.   
 
 The overall goals of this strategy are three: 
 
1.  Food security in the local sense of helping farm populations to become secure on a 
household level 
 
2.  Food security in the national sense of generating marketed surpluses to replace 
expensive imports and to improve the balance of payments 
 
3.  Promote self sustaining growth in rural areas and in agriculture in particular 
 
 This vision can be divided into three levels of involvement.  First is the micro or 
farm level, where there are substantial needs in terms of assistance to health, education, 
production and other income generating activities, marketing and infrastructure.  Second 
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is the marketing system which connects individual farm households and villages to the 
larger regional and national economy.  Third is the national level, which provides both 
sources of inputs and markets for outputs, as well as setting the overall relative prices 
faced by rural inhabitants as they make production and consumption decisions. 
 
 Given the three levels of involvement, it is envisioned that intervention/assistance 
will be needed at each level, from the national level down to the farm level.  The current 
campaign for decentralization gives government sanction to such an approach, mandating 
that activities be located at the lowest level of government possible in order to ensure 
direct contact with client populations.   
 
 It should be noted that currently national production satisfies a little less than half 
of national needs according to information from the WFP and the Famine Early Warning 
System and as shown in the national food balance shown in Table 3.  Given the sharp 
decline in  WFP involvement in grain distributions projected over the coming year, a high 
priority is a return to national grain self sufficiency, both for reasons of economic 
efficiency and security of farm and non-farm populations alike.  This will not be easy.  
Roughly speaking, a doubling of the current level of output in five years would require 
almost a 15% growth rate each year.  This is an ambitious goal under any circumstances, 
but it is clearly one that cannot be achieved without substantial growth in yields and 
outputs at the farm level. 
 
 A final note:  A strategy which gives priority to large farmers and smallholders 
who are most able to also produce marketed surplus to help satisfy the 
national/macroeconomic portion of the stated goals is not one which is directly aimed at 
the poorest of the poor.  Rather, it is aimed directly at the populations where the highest 
return on investment can be obtained consistent with a growth strategy that maximizes 
welfare increases for the bottom half of the income scale.  This follows from the fact that 
in order to make growth self sustaining – ultimately the only way to sustainably help the 
poorest of the poor – investments must have a high return in order to themselves become 
self sustaining on the micro level.  It is this – the creation of attractive income generating 
opportunities – that is the core of this strategy, rather than trying to raise welfare by 
directly providing services without the long run revenue streams needed to keep them 
going. 
 
 
B.  Promotion of Increased Production and Marketed Surplus  – An Integrated 
Approach 
 
 Angola’s relative abundance of arable land (with some important exceptions)  
implies that land-using technologies which can increase cultivated area are likely to be 
economically efficient, particularly as newly rehabilitated roads give better market access 
to new areas.  In addition, higher yielding varieties as well as disease resistant varieties of 
important crops have the potential to significantly increase incomes for smallholders. The 
key to unlocking this potential is an increased emphasis on applied research linked with 
extension to disseminate improved technologies.  Much of the needed research is 
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adaptive in nature; “off-the-shelf” varieties and technologies are readily accessible and 
can be adapted to Angolan conditions within a relatively short time.  The cost-benefit 
ratios of such a strategy represent a major opportunity. 
 
 To take one example, current maize yields on many farms in the Planalto typically 
range from around 350 kg/ha to around 400 kg/ha.  Doubling of these yields is entirely 
feasible and in fact has been demonstrated in Huambo province but cannot be achieved 
without increased application of fertilizers and/or adoption of improved varieties.  
Another entirely feasible possibility is the re-establishment of animal traction through 
this area, after the widespread loss of large animals through the years of conflict.  This 
would allow households to farm larger areas than they are able to  productively use at the 
present time. 
 
 The most binding constraints on the production side can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
1. Assured supplies of seed, with an institutionalized capacity to develop and disseminate 
improved varieties appropriate to the various regions. 
 
2. Availability of inputs, particularly fertilizers, from a sustainable private sector input 
marketing system 
 
3.  Availability of draft animals historically supplied from southern provinces with a 
culture and comparative advantage based on animal production 
 
4. Credit facilities to allow farmers to take advantage of these alternatives 
 
5. Assured market access and information to allow informed decisions regarding 
production and consumption. 
 
6. Adequate extension services to assist in the adoption and use of all of the above 
 
7.  Though not a constraint per se it is important to mention the importance of farmer 
associations as a mediating institution to facilitate addressing the previous six points. 
 
8.  Water control on a small scale is also important in may areas of high agricultural 
potential. 
 
 The first item, improved seeds which are readily available to smallholders, 
requires the development of a strong national research effort in major crops directly 
linked with on-farm trials and seed multiplication efforts.  The obvious institutional 
location for such an effort is the Instituto de Investigacao Agronomica which has been 
newly rehabilitated in Huambo.  Linking the development of the IIA directly to 
successful screening and adoption of improved varieties will institutionalize the linkage 
between research and extension which is fundamental to realizing the benefits inherent in 
improved seeds. 
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 Such an effort is already under way in Huambo province.  Accordingly, 
evaluation of this effort and related efforts elsewhere to judge which components merit 
replication or additional resources would be a good first step in this area.   
 
 The second item, fertilizers, are as noted elsewhere in this report, an area in which 
there has been substantial government interference and mismanagement in the past.  
Accordingly, this strategy recommends a complete government withdrawal from fertilizer 
sale and distribution, with the possible exception of government auction of imported bulk 
supplies insofar as these arrive from donors or other sources.  Investigation of the 
advisability/feasibility of domestic fertilizer production is warranted given the abundance 
of feedstocks from oil production (most natural gas found in association with oil is 
currently simply flared off) and the demand both within Angola and surrounding 
countries in the region.  What is NOT appropriate is any government provision of 
subsidized supplies since this will undercut and prevent private sector development. 
 
 The third area, draft animals, is one which has already seen the beginnings of 
reactivation as transport routes between southern provinces and central demand centers 
have been reopened.  However, this process is slow, both because of the natural rate of 
increase of bovines, but also because of the inability of many farmers to afford large 
animals.  This is not an area where there are ready examples within Angola which can be 
extended or replicated, but is one which merits study and experimentation with programs 
designed to provide self-sustaining growth in draft animal use and production. 
 
 Extensive growth is obviously attractive when a large percentage of arable land 
lies unused in the most productive areas.  Simply put, there is a limit to how much land a 
family farmer can be expected to till using hand tools such as hoes.  If the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic worsens, as has been projected by some, it will make the need for land-
using/labor-saving technological change all the more imperative.  It is highly likely that 
Angola has yet to see the worst of the AIDS crisis in rural areas.  This means that labor 
shortages of prime working age people (as compared to the availability of arable land) are 
likely to grow more severe in the years to come. 
 
 Mechanization projects promoting tractors in areas currently using hand-hoe 
technology are unlikely to prove any more effective in Angola than they have in the past 
in other countries, even though there are certainly some instances in which tractors will 
be the preferred technology.  However, in these cases it is also likely to be the case that 
what external financial assistance is necessary will be accessible by the farmers 
themselves.  This implies that animal traction is likely to be the preferred method for 
growth at the extensive margin in most areas. 
 
 First, animal traction is well known in the central provinces though the animal 
population was severely reduced during the conflict and dislocations of the past years.  
Traditional trade routes with southern provinces which supply animals have already been 
reported to be reopening, but are hampered both by poor transport and lack of funds to 
purchase animals.  Second, research into the potential for other species, particularly 
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equines, could also help.  In fact, there is a history of donkey and mule use in Angola 
prior to independence, so there is clearly potential in this area, especially for transport 
purposes. 
 
 However, it is important to note that development of animal traction will 
necessarily take time.  In the South, where cattle production has long been an integral 
part of the farm economy and rural society in general there is much less potential for 
increased crop production due to inferior fertility and rainfall.  In the Center where such 
potential does exist, there is a problem of lack of the needed investment funds for those 
communities just recovering from the conflict.  In the North there are possibilities, but 
animal traction is less well known in addition to suffering greater problems from tsetse 
infestation.    
 
 The fourth area, credit, is perhaps the most problematic from a variety of points of 
view.  First, it must be acknowledged that the most viable client populations for a self-
sustaining credit system in the short term are not the “poorest of the poor”.  While micro 
credit schemes directed toward such populations have had some success elsewhere in the 
world, they are both slow and also not always targeted at those farmers most able to 
expand production.  Such schemes are good and should be promoted, but in order to 
directly assist both the highest return small farmers and the national food balance, 
farmers who are most able to benefit are those who have some level of established 
production and basic capital already. 
 
 Some success has already been demonstrated in this area by an NGO, CLUSA, 
which promotes the development of farmer associations in conjunction with a collective 
mechanism for assured access to suppliers and buyers supported by credit from the 
formal banking system.  The fundamental key in terms of credit is two-fold: 
 
 -  The NGO backs their micro level credits with a loan guarantee fund to 
eliminate the risk which typically prevents banks from engaging in agricultural lending 
 
 - The NGO also provides the mediation and training needed to first identify 
appropriate borrowers and then educate them in the requirements of credit usage so that 
the banks themselves are freed from the need to have direct local contact and knowledge 
of the farm populations. 
 
 It should be noted that this is not a fast process – it can take years for farmer 
associations to arrive at the point at which they can deal with banks directly without 
assistance.  However, the fact that formal loans are made directly with these clients from 
the outset paves the way for entry into the formal economy as soon as possible. 
 
 From the point of view of the World Bank, assistance to support replication of 
these NGO activities in cooperation with decentralized extension units (EDA’s) will help 
to institutionalize these mechanisms for the future.  Extending these microcredit 
initiatives to include small rural businesses such as marketing, transport, agricultural 
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implement supply, or food processing is also a good way to promote the needed 
recapitalization of these sectors. 
 The fifth item, market access and information, can be addressed most directly at 
the outset by including a tertiary road and bridge component in any rural rehabilitation 
loan that is developed.  There is still a huge problem in the countryside of villages and 
farms that are essentially completely isolated from the market.  Some of these needs can 
also be accomplished through the existing FAS, which allows for construction of small 
bridges or other community felt needs for relieving bottlenecks, but the expense of roads 
and bridges are typically beyond the capacity of this mechanism. 
 
 One important intervention which could be supported through the FAS would be 
promotion and funding of community crop storage facilities.  These would help in the 
assembling of sufficient bulk to attract traders while enabling farmers to take advantage 
of fluctuations in the market.  Designs capable of local manufacture can be adapted with 
the assistance of the FAO. 
 
 Labor intensive road building and maintenance will not only open villages to 
market links but will at the same time provide a cash infusion to the local economy.  This 
will have its own beneficial multiplier effects, promoting activity in other sectors.  As 
noted above, it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of this activity. 
 
 Market information is key for farmers and should be disseminated as widely as 
possible.  Replication of successful experiences elsewhere in Africa of weekly radio 
programs to publicize crop prices in different locations would be a good first step.  
However, a prior necessity is the development of a system to collect such information in 
the first place (see below). 
 
 The sixth element of the strategy is the development of a strong market oriented 
extension service to support the dissemination of information and the adoption of new 
technologies/varieties by the farming population.  This is an effort which cannot be 
accomplished with any single effort.  Rather, a variety of initiatives at the central and 
decentralized levels will be needed, but by far the most important are those at the field 
level closest to the farmers. 
 
 The European Commission has a project of this nature, but it is necessarily 
limited in scope given the expenses involved.  With a pilot phase of 5 municipalities, it 
will provide a useful test of the basic needs for reestablishing and strengthening the direct 
contact arm of the national extension service, the EDA’s.  In essence, these need to be 
improved in terms of staffing and training for market oriented functions, and technology 
adoption and are greatly in need of basic reconstruction in many parts of the country.  
With between 70 and 75 EDA’s existing, it is clear that this is a long way from the level 
of effort that is needed, but it is very important to recognize the need to approach the 
EDA’s one by one at the most decentralized level in order to ensure the functions and 
close farmer contact that is needed for success.  It is also essential to link the extension 
system as closely as possible to field research wherever possible, to maximize the impact 
of this research on farm households. 
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 At the same time, it will be essential to strengthen the central core functions of the 
IDA (the entity which is responsible for the EDAs) in order for it to adequately backstop 
its decentralized units and to break away from its former top-down mode of operation.  
This means much greater emphasis on its information gathering functions as opposed to 
its information propagation functions.  In addition, it is important to consciously link 
extension with research efforts at this macro level as well as the micro level, perhaps 
through an institutionalized linkage committee. 
 
 The seventh item noted above is the need to develop producer associations as a 
mediating institution for the other initiatives noted above.  Farmer associations can be 
important (IF they are developed independent of the government) as a way to give 
individual farmer interests greater weight in market transactions on both the input and 
output sides.  They can also greatly increase the efficiency of outreach and 
communication efforts and provide an entry point for extension and credit activities.  In 
credit in particular, associations are a way to surmount some of the monitoring and 
information asymmetry problems inherent in such efforts. 
 
 Finally, the eighth item is small scale water control.  The issue of irrigation is 
closely related to issues of large farms vs. small farms in Angola.  This strategy proposes 
a reorientation of irrigation investment toward smaller scale systems since these hold the 
promise of higher returns whether implemented on large farms or small.  The bulk of the 
government’s current investments in agriculture are currently devoted rehabilitation of 
large irrigation schemes which are unlikely to benefit any but a handful of farmers.  
Though high value horticultural crop production on the coast is a likely beneficiary of 
these investments it is not at all clear that even these crops can justify the expense of such 
large expenditures.  In fact, it is not at all clear even that technical issues surrounding 
rehabilitation of large irrigation schemes can be solved in all cases.20  Even if they can be, 
issues surrounding water rights, management, and organization of users remain to be 
resolved. 
 
 Water control is, however, important for all producers even in areas with good 
rainfall, particularly in the planalto central where  simple gravity fed systems are 
commonly used.  Virtually none of the Ministry’s budget is devoted to these ends.  
However, in the case of farming systems which include water control and/or conservation 
of various types outside of large perimeter systems, it is not best to split out irrigation for 
separate management and support. 
 
 Irrigation is not an end in itself.  Rather, water control can only be adequately 
supported as part of an overall vision of a given farming system, its needs and its natural 
resource base.  In this way, water control can then be promoted as part of a multi-use 
system where irrigation is one of a series of goals including uses such as drinking water, 
aquaculture and more.  Accordingly, support to water control is best combined with 
overall support and development efforts for producers provided through extension 
services or other development projects.  This would imply that the Ministry’s unit for 
water resources, DNHER, would not take an active role in investing in, and supporting 
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such efforts.  Rather, their role would be one of research and assistance to extension, in 
addition to their current role of managing large irrigation schemes.  Given the request by 
the DNHER for assistance in developing a national irrigation policy, it would appear to 
be an opportune time for donor assistance and reform. 
 
 
Fertilizer Policy 
 
 The issue of fertilizer policy is one which deserves particular attention, due not 
only to its importance in the central highlands, but also due to the policy failures of the 
past.   There is no doubt that achieving sustained output increases in the central highlands 
will require fertilizer inputs.  Soils are typically deficient in at least two macronutrients 
(nitrogen and phosphorus) and the major crops, maize, beans and potatoes, are all 
responsive to fertilizer applications. 
 
 In the past (see above) fertilizer distributions were the responsibility of a 
parastatal which failed to accomplish this task.  Indeed, this is not a problem unique to 
Angola – state sponsored fertilizer distributions have a long and dismal history of failure 
in many different parts of the world.  There is no reason to think Angola will be any 
different in the future in this regard than it was in the past or than dozens of other 
countries have been.   
 
 What, then, to do?  First, it is important to realize that the only sustainable 
fertilizer supply system in the long run is one run by the private sector.  However, the 
private sector has failed to perform adequately in the past, so the important issue is to 
look at the constraints to private sector involvement and how they can be addressed: 
 
- The first constraint is the continued sporadic distributions of subsidized fertilizer by the 
government.  Though these don’t typically benefit smallholders, they are nevertheless 
extremely detrimental to market development since a viable fertilizer supply system will 
depend on demand from commercial farmers as well as small farmers to be viable.  In 
short, the private sector will never develop if there is a continuing threat that the 
government might at any time ruin their market by undercutting them with low priced 
product.  How to address this?   What is needed is a public and ironclad government 
commitment to stay out of the fertilizer market, and particularly to stay out of the 
business of subsidizing fertilizer. 
 
-  The second constraint is the perception that there is a lack of private sector operators 
willing to put up the capital necessary to finance large fertilizer imports.  In large part, the 
solution to this is the same as the solution to the first constraint above, but insofar as this 
does not go far enough there are several possible options.  First, would be a loan 
guarantee for banks in order to promote the necessary financing.  Second would be the 
auction of those supplies of fertilizers provided by donors in small lots in provincial 
capitals.    
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 Though these are not a long term solutions, it is important to note that it is very 
much in line with standard economic theoretical diagnoses of markets and risk.  There is 
no getting around the fact the fertilizer markets are inherently risky, and particularly so in 
Angola.  It is entirely appropriate for government to assume this risk while at the same 
time ensuring private market development at the wholesale and retail levels.  Auctions 
can ensure market pricing given the sale of small lots with appropriate safeguards against 
monopoly power.  As demand grows, incentive for entry into the market can also grow 
assuming that adequate measures to avoid either market or government instigated risk 
have been taken. 
 
-  The third constraint is the high cost of fertilizer on the international market (though the 
overvalued exchange rate ameliorates this to some extent).  One possible solution to this 
is the construction of a fertilizer plant in Cabinda where there are both rock phosphates 
and natural gas feedstocks readily available.  This is an option that should be studied 
extremely carefully before going ahead given the very large optimal scale of fertilizer 
plants and the less than stellar record of such facilities in developing countries.  
Nevertheless, the ready availability of raw materials in Angola makes it at least a viable 
candidate for a feasibility study, which is reportedly now being undertaken by USAID. 
 
 
C.  Marketing, Rural Development and Food Security 
 
 Until the past several years, probably the most underdeveloped, indeed repressed, 
part of the national food system and the national economy in general was marketing.  
This was a consequence not only of the disappearance of the colonial marketing system 
upon independence in 1975 but of the Marxist sensibilities of those educated in the Soviet 
bloc (many Angolans received higher education in the USSR, Eastern Europe and Cuba 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s).  Marketing was viewed as a parasitical and non-productive 
activity, and one which was to be strictly controlled.  In addition, the widespread 
destruction which accompanied the civil conflicts of the 1980’s and 90’s resulted in the 
virtual disappearance of much of the physical infrastructure as well. 
 
 These suspicious attitudes toward marketing are still evident in conversation with 
many Angolans even today.  Perhaps equally important is the attitude toward 
information, the life blood of a liberalized market system, as an instrument of power and 
control rather than as something to be disseminated as widely as possible.  One of the 
most important parts of any policy reform package will be the elimination of remaining 
control mechanisms on marketing as well as the creation of institutions devoted to 
collecting and disseminating market information as widely as possible. 
 
 In light of these observations, the following elements should be part of an overall 
vision for rehabilitating the marketing system 
 
1.  Eliminate all remaining controls on marketing margins as well as reforming the 
Economic Police who enforce them.   
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2. Continue rehabilitation of roads and bridges as funding permits over the coming years. 
 
3.  Fund construction of basic municipal markets in important market centers. 
 
4.  Support creation of market information data collection agency within MINADER 
and/or the Ministerio do Comercio.   
 
5.  Support rapid publication and dissemination of this information via bulletins and radio 
and TV. 
 
6.  Make a concerted effort to eliminate internal roadblocks and other security problems 
which inhibit the free circulation of goods. 
 
7. Support extension of telecommunications and IT to rural areas to facilitate access to 
market information. 
 
 
 
 
D.  Agriculture and Regional Development 
 
 Many observers have seen the Planalto Central as the key to agricultural 
development in Angola.  See Figure 10 for a map of this region.  While the importance of 
this zone is obvious, it is important to view it in the context of the country as a whole.  
The Planalto is at the same time the traditional granary of the country and the area of 
densest population.  Promotion of grain production and export in this area is in many 
ways an exercise in rehabilitation, something that makes it an easier task, in addition to 
having significant positive aspects in terms of poverty alleviation.    Proximity to major 
demand centers (Huambo city) provides an additional incentive as will eventual 
rehabilitation of transport links to demand centers on the coast.  Based on these facts 
some donors have decided to focus their efforts only on some provinces or regions, 
particularly the central planalto.  
 
 However, neither the government nor the World Bank can restrict its focus to only 
one or a few provinces.  While prioritization must necessarily occur, and initial efforts 
will of course not happen simultaneously in all parts of the country, it is essential that the 
government’s vision and strategy have a coherent national focus, with activities in each 
area appropriate to that region’s advantages and possibilities.  This means that 
investments should not be at odds with long run potentials, but must also take into 
account current evaluations of profitability and market access.  There are distinct long run 
advantages in different regions, which should not be forgotten as many donors 
concentrate their efforts in the central provinces.  In particular, we can name at least three 
distinct areas in addition to the planalto which have a clear and important role in a long-
run vision of the sector’s future: 
 
-  Northern provinces have both higher rainfall and more fertile soils than do the central 
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provinces of the planalto.  Given the dominance of cassava culture, there is more work to 
do in terms of extension and market development to promote growth of other crops which 
can be readily sold in national and international markets, but this cannot change the fact 
that the inherent natural and agroclimatic advantages of these areas are substantial.  
Deficient infrastructure (particularly roads) will retard progress in the immediate future, 
but these areas without doubt should figure prominently in a long run national strategy. 
 
 One distinct advantage of development in the northern provinces is the fact that 
more fertile soils lessen the imperative to develop fertilizer markets.  However, as noted 
elsewhere in this report, the long history of coffee cultivation in some areas has led to 
efforts to reestablish this crop as the basis of the agricultural economy there.  
Unfortunately, such efforts do not take into account the now vastly different international 
market conditions for coffee, as well as the transformed labor market conditions within 
Angola.  As road access is improved, market opportunities for a wide variety of 
smallholder crops will become viable in profit terms.  These opportunities will detract 
from the ability of coffee plantations to attract needed low-cost labor which in colonial 
times was available on a forced basis. 
 
 The prevalence of cassava culture and the relative lack of experience with other 
crops will, as noted above, make development in the northern provinces a much longer 
term prospect than more purely rehabilitation efforts elsewhere.  Even so, cost studies in 
these areas would help demonstrate the feasibility and profitability of such 
diversification. 
 
-  Dryer southern provinces (e.g. Cunene, Namibe, parts of Huila) have a long history of 
animal production which can be developed to satisfy national needs over the long term.  
While not a short run proposition, this merits a place in the long term vision, particularly 
in light of the shortage of draft animals in other parts of the country. 
 
 The beginnings of this trade are already evident as farmers in Huambo province 
cite northern Huila as the source of draft animals.  Given the natural rate of increase of 
bovines, and the near total loss of animals in large parts of the country, there will be a 
long term demand for trade with the relatively less damaged south.  This trade should 
remain a factor indefinitely as basic conditions for livestock are much more favorable in 
the south than elsewhere.  While meat production for the country is a reasonable long 
term goal, the current near total absence of transport infrastructure and refrigeration, as 
well as the limited capacity of slaughterhouses will prevent this development in the short 
to medium term. 
 
-  Areas in close proximity to major demand centers (e.g. the areas around Luanda, 
Benguela, and other cities) have developed production of high value crops such as fruits 
and vegetables.  This is a normal development and is one to be supported and 
encouraged.  It should be noted that it is unlikely that grain crops can be efficiently 
grown on irrigated land, particularly given the existence of large rain fed production 
zones.21
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Figure 10:  Map of Central Planalto 
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 Given the imperative of replacing food imports and achieving minimal caloric 
intake for recently resettled populations in the near term, the different regions’ potentials 
suggest a prioritization in terms of time frame.  Those areas which can yield relatively 
quick results, i.e. the traditional grain producing areas in the center and high value 
horticultural crops in periurban areas (though these are likely to need less or no direct 
government support), are the first order of business.  Animal production, though equally 
important, cannot produce results as quickly given the natural rate of increase of bovines 
and other draft animals.  Accordingly, though an early start is indicated, results cannot be 
expected in the very short term in provinces primarily engaged in these activities.  Other 
provinces where there are severe marketing constraints and where the traditional crops 
are mainly cassava and coffee will take somewhat more time to develop into viable 
sources for marketed surpluses of staple foods.  Though the returns to investments in 
these zones are likely to be high, it is also the case that they will take considerable time to 
materialize. 
 
Agriculture and the Southern African Region 
 
 In terms of agricultural exports, there are few immediate opportunities for Angola 
given the massive grain deficits at the present time.  However, if large scale grain 
production is reestablished there would be possibilities for export to food deficit countries 
elsewhere in Southern Africa.  Lower quality requirements in such countries could, in 
spite of associated price discounts, allow Angolan product a more ready access tha other 
international destinations.   
 
 Possibilities on the input side are more obvious and in some cases are already 
being exploited.  SADCC has regional cooperative programs in agricultural research and 
Angola is a participant.  Continuation of these efforts is worthwhile, though, of course, 
not at the expense of development of locally adapted varieties more directly usable in 
Angola.  Perhaps an even bigger opportunity is presented by Angola’s potential for 
fertilizer production.  As noted in the section on fertilizer policy, this option must remain 
purely speculative pending feasibility and appraisal studies now under way.  However, 
the ability to export product to regional countries and beyond could help production to 
occur at a scale compatible with lowest unit cost.  Though neighboring countries in 
Africa are not  large fertilizer consumers the long run need is indisputable, making this an 
opportunity worth investigating. 
 
 
E.  Spending on Agriculture22 
 
 The point was made in the sections above that agricultural development cannot be 
expected to succeed if the real exchange rate continues to appreciate as it has over the 
past three years.  These points will not be repeated here except to say that to allow these 
macroeconomic problems to undermine agricultural development will prevent overall 
rural development, and will sabotage the hope of sustained increases in security and 
welfare for the vast majority of the population.  There are numerous examples of such 
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problems elsewhere in Africa and around the world – while it is may sound alarmist to 
speak in such dire terms about the problems, it is in fact appropriate given what we know 
will be the result if we allow it to continue.23 
 
 A second issue relating to the macro level is that of adequate funding of 
agriculture as mandated by NEPAD and supported by the growth potential of investments 
in the sector. The allocation of budgetary resources to the sector in recent years has 
been even lower than its share of GDP. Allocations to MINADER for current expenditure 
for 2004 are AKZ 3.2 billion, or only 0.64% of the national total. However, only AKZ 
954 million of this amount had been approved by MINFIN as of March 2004.  
 
 Capital allocations to the agricultural sector have been somewhat better, at just 
under 2% of the PIP, or AKZ 1.5 billion. A relatively minor AKZ 5.9 million was also 
budgeted in the 2004 PRINF for irrigation development. It should be noted that a 
considerable portion of the PIP – over 40% - was allocated to provincial governments in 
2004.  Of this amount, an analysis of provincial expenditure budgets indicates that 8.2% 
(approximately AKZ 4 billion) was assigned to agriculture and other rural purposes; 
2.3% (AKZ 1.65 billion) was purely for agriculture, mostly in the form of irrigation 
rehabilitation. Non-irrigation infrastructure absorbed the majority of provincial capital 
expenditures.  
 Given the destruction of most rural infrastructure, and the abandonment of most 
Government services in rural areas, such limited budgetary allocations have rendered it 
impossible to rebuild and resume effective support to rural activities in large areas of the 
country. To some extent, such budgetary shortfalls have been compensated for by the 
use of bilateral and multilateral lines of credit. However, these have also been limited in 
scope and targeted largely at irrigation rehabilitation (see Annex 1). A listing provided 
by MINADER showed only US$154 in approved projects, with a further five projects in 
negotiation. 
 
F.  Decentralization and Agriculture 
 
 Agriculture is perhaps the prototypical example of an activity that is not best 
managed from a capital city.  While there are undoubtedly activities which must be 
centrally funded and directed agriculture is by its very nature a dispersed and 
decentralized activity.  This fact, together with Angola’s extremely wide variation in 
agroclimatic zones, infrastructure, and market proximity make linkage of the strategy for 
agriculture and the strategy for decentralization a high priority. 
 
 If the key to long term growth is productivity improvement at the farm level 
coupled with development of marketing chains to connect farmers with demand centers 
and/or ports there are necessarily many expenditures which must be made at a level well 
below that of the country or even the province.  Experience in other countries has 
demonstrated that funding large sector development programs through the central 
ministerial apparatus will not necessarily result in increased funding levels at the 
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provincial, district or municipio levels.24   Structuring a project from the very outset to 
emphasize decentralized decision making and disbursement will enable this field level 
impact to be felt much earlier, even as the central apparatus is itself streamlined and 
strengthened. 
 
 
1.  MINADER’s Central Functions 
 
 The Ministerio da Agricultural e Desenvolvimento Rural is, as its name indicates, 
dedicated not just to agricultural production per se as in the days before liberalization, but 
to rural  development in general, a much broader concept including all aspects of the rural 
economy, society and space.  This is entirely in accord with broader concerns typically 
addressed by ministries of agriculture elsewhere in the world and typified by donor 
strategies aimed at “food security” rather than output increases alone.  However, even 
food security, though a broad concept, does not include matters of health, education, and 
other sectors that relate to overall rural development.  While recognizing that food 
security is an integral, indeed fundamental, component of this strategy, it is nevertheless 
the case that that MINADER is a principal counterpart for implementation of the strategy 
for reactivation of agriculture.  This is entirely appropriate given the fact that the vast 
majority of the population in rural areas relies on agriculture directly or indirectly for  
 
their livelihoods and at current low levels of income spend most of what they earn on 
food and other agriculturally derived products. 
 
 Since MINADER is the governmental entity with jurisdiction over many potential 
interventions that could be proposed to implement this strategy, it is worthwhile 
examining its institutional strengths and weaknesses.    An organigram is shown in Annex 
2.  The structure discussed here is as described verbally by the Minister and National 
Directors, but it is worth noting that the personnel and functions of the Ministry have not 
changed radically from what they have been in the past.   
 
  The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  is responsible for 
agriculture, irrigation, forestry, food security, issuance of rural land titles (although it 
has recently lost its role in cadastral and land registration to the Ministry of Urban 
Affairs), agricultural research and agricultural extension; the latter through the Agrarian 
Development Institute (IDA) and its existing 54 field stations (referred to as EDAs) in 
13 provinces. In addition to extension services, EDAs provide limited amounts of 
agricultural inputs (seeds, tools etc.) and do some data collection using their 1,000 staff. 
Until 1998, EDAs were controlled by the provincial governments and they are likely to 
return to provincial or municipal control under decentralization proposals now being 
debated. The structure of MINADER and the staffing and budget allocation by 
department are detailed in Annex 3. 
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  Headquarters staff amount to 411 persons of an authorised establishment of nearly 
80025. Nearly 270 of these are classified as professionals. In rural areas, MINADER’s 
rural presence in addition to the EDAs arises principally from the following activities: 
(a) seven ‘Agriculture Development Offices’ established in key development areas and 
largely associated with the management of major irrigation schemes; (b) Provincial 
Directorates of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries (MINADERF) which 
bring together MINADER and the ministries responsible for fisheries and environment 
and operate under provincial control; (c) five Regional Forestry Development Centres, 
under the control of the Forestry Development Institute, responsible for promotion of 
sustainable forestry and wildlife management, and; (d) a number of specialist research 
institutes including agronomy, veterinary, coffee, cereals, and seeds. There is also a 
small veterinary service. MINADER field staff are estimated to total more than 2,000 
persons. 
 While the ongoing push for decentralization would seem to imply a new 
relationship between the central Ministry and its provincial and lower dependent organs, 
these have yet to be spelled out concretely.  For example, the decentralization law 
dictates that the municipio level EDA’s (Estacoes de Desenvolvimento Agricola) the 
Ministry’s lowest level structure, are to be under the authority of their corresponding 
local authorities and to rely on central ministerial support for technical backstopping 
when necessary.  However, the financial flows that would allow this independence have 
not yet been defined much less actually allocated, nor have specific areas of 
responsibility been defined.26   Indeed, at the present time, there is no independent fiscal 
authority at the provincial level.  This applies both to tax collection and to expenditure 
authority, which is in almost all cases exercised by central rather than by provincial 
entities.27 
 
 Accordingly, explicit definition of the roles and jurisdictions of each level of 
bureaucracy, from the national level to the provinces, districts and municipios needs to be 
made clear to all parties.  In addition, the lines of authority also need to be made clear and 
the financial flows that will support this should also be set up.  To date, none of this has 
happened, but to the extent desired by the government, assistance in making these 
definitions would be a step forward. 
 
 It should be noted that this is not a problem specific to MINADER.  Rather it is 
government-wide, but is perhaps particularly pressing in agriculture given the importance 
of decentralized functions in this area.  While relations between the provincial entities 
and the center are not specified under current law, there is no bar to operationalizing 
appropriate relationships in any particular case, including agriculture. 
 
 
2.  Policy Analysis Unit  
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 Within MINADER itself the most striking deficiency is a lack of policy analysis 
and evaluation capacity.  For example,  the DNAPF, responsible for setting policy for 
agricultural, livestock and forestry sectors, does not have a single economist on its staff, 
while the Gabinete de Seguranca Alimentar has only one, trained in Cuba.  Technically, 
this function belongs to the Gabinete de Estudo e Planeamento (GEPE), but in reality this 
office has very little analytical capacity.  It is the entity which allocates money from the 
General State Budget to the various parts of the Ministry and as such has always been a 
politically powerful position.  However, no attempt at cost/benefit analysis or project 
evaluation or development is made, with decisions being made on other grounds.   For 
example, most of the Ministry’s investment budget has been directed toward 
rehabilitation of large irrigation projects, but these expenditures have not been subjected 
to any meaningful analysis of risk and return.  Indeed, the GEPE seems resistant to such 
an idea, focusing instead on long range plans and balancing political demands of the 
various constituencies.   
 
 In addition, information systems and data allowing such analysis are not currently 
readily available in the Planning office.  Systematic collection and tracking of money 
from donors and from the State budget to form a unified and coherent budget picture are 
essential to the most basic planning and evaluation efforts.  Similarly, much important 
information on agricultural and rural activities on a provincial and lower level are not 
systematically collected or analyzed, making it impossible to allocate Ministerial efforts 
across the country on the basis of these facts.   
 
 Accordingly, a key need in the Ministry is an office of policy analysis and 
evaluation, reporting directly to the Minister, and with the following capabilities: 
 
- Improved data collection and analysis systems for agriculture, food and other rural 
activities 
 
- Unified information collection on donor and Ministry activities and financial flows. 
- Policy analysis capability to evaluate alternative interventions and regulations in terms 
of their desired effects on rural outcomes. 
 
- Project preparation and appraisal capability, to evaluate alternative investments, to 
prepare projects for funding, and to monitor and implement projects in progress 
 
 In particular it is recommended that support be given to a multi-year Market 
Support Program in either the Ministerio do Comercio/DNCI or MINADER along the 
lines of the current FAO/EU Program in Mozambique, to give support to legislative and 
regulation change, marketing information service provision, marketing system analysis, 
and market promotion, but adapted to the specific needs of Angola. 
 
 
3.  Statistical Unit 
 
 Another institutional problem in MINADER is the weakness of the statistical 
collection effort, particularly in terms of market related information on prices and trade 
flows.  Currently, the only entities in Angola performing these functions are the USAID 
funded Famine Early Warning System, which has constructed the beginnings of such a 
system and the WFP’s system of monitors for crop evaluation.   However, FEWS is 
currently woefully underfunded and lacking in the ability to cover all geographical areas.  
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Building of a permanent system on the basis of what has been accomplished so far would 
go far toward providing the basic data needed for analyzing prices and markets.  The 
Planning Office is responsible for this function within the Ministry, but it is 
recommended that this unit be linked instead with the proposed market analysis and 
policy evaluation unit to enable better linkages with those using the information. 
 
 Currently, the FAO is sponsoring a project to collect and disseminate market 
information.  Information on prices and trade flows should be given the widest possible 
dissemination, and it is recommended that current proposals to translate provincial price 
reports by the FEWS office into Portuguese for widespread dissemination be rapidly 
approved by the Ministerio do Comercio.  Institutionalization of this process within the 
Ministry would be beneficial. 
 
 One note is important.  A statistical unit should be independent of any parts of the 
industry with line responsibilities (e.g. the National Directorates or the Institutes).  This 
will avoid any incentive to bias information in favor of one activity or another.  The goal 
of the statistical unit should be solely to collect and disseminate the most accurate 
information possible.  It might be possible to use some of the staff of the Gabinete de 
Seguranca Alimentar as a nucleus of such a unit, but many of the current staff would 
benefit substantially from opportunities for further education in market related analysis 
outside of Angola.  Education in the former Soviet bloc did not typically provide the 
needed basis for this type of work.   
 
 In order to provide an accurate basis for any subsequent decision making it will be 
essential to collect some basic national survey information regarding area planted and 
crops produced.  At the present time there is no recent information collected on a 
consistent basis nationwide.  The WFP network of monitors could be used to perform 
such a task, which can be considered as part of preliminary project appraisal activities. 
 
 
4. Reforming and Renewing MINADER’s Existing Directorates and Institutes 
 
 MINADER’s executive and specialized organs are currently divided into 
Directorates and Institutes respectively (See organigram in Annex 2;  A more detailed 
description together with budgetary allocations is in Annex 3).  Under the former 
command economy, directorates had a far more direct role in production and allocation 
systems than is the case at the present time.  Interviews with the National Directors made 
it clear that there is a serious need for capacity building and clarification of missions in 
these parts of the Ministry.   
 
 The National Directorate for Agriculture, Livestock and Forests (DNAPF) is 
responsible for policy and strategies for the sectors defined in its name, but it is striking 
that it has not a single economist on its staff.  This is a quite glaring omission in a unit 
ostensibly responsible for policy in a market economy.  However, perhaps an even bigger 
problem is the limited focus of the Directorate - in conversations with its staff it was said 
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that it was responsible only for commercial farmers, with the Instituto de 
Desenvolvimento Agrario (IDA) being responsible for the household sector.  As noted 
elsewhere in this report, this distinction, though not without some factual basis, serves to 
perpetuate colonial era categorizations which are based on a view of smallholders as not 
having major commercial potential.  Apart from this, it makes little sense from an 
organizational point of view to put responsibility for one type of farm in a Directorate 
while another is served by an Institute.  A rationalization of missions, with a clear 
unification of strategies and a level playing field for all farms should be one goal of a 
reform effort. 
 
 The National Directorate for Agricultural Hydraulics and Rural Engineering 
(DNHAER) is the oldest of the existing directorates and is principally responsible for 
irrigation systems as well as rural electrification, mechanization, and rural construction.  
Irrigation is by far the most important activity and one which is the recipient of large 
sums of money for rehabilitation of colonial era irrigation schemes.  Here also, as in the 
DNAPF, there is a strong need for economists trained in project appraisal techniques in 
order to evaluate the benefits to be expected from the large expenditures made on these 
schemes.  To date, these projects, though the object of the bulk of MINADER’s capital 
expenditures, have not been subjected to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.  More 
generally, the National Director expressed a need for a defined national irrigation policy, 
something that properly falls within the purview of this directorate and which the 
Ministry has requested FAO assistance to complete. The results of this effort will be 
important in defining the needed staff and structure of this directorate in the future. 
 
 The National Directorate of Rural Development (DNDR) is responsible for 
cadastre and land registry, resolution of conflicts related to this and also has a department 
devoted to studies and projects in the area of rural development.  As noted elsewhere in 
this report, land registration and titling is a very important activity, as is a thorough 
debate regarding the new Land Law.  Ensuring transparent processes to accomplish this 
as well as the staff and resources to do it properly will be important for the future of this 
directorate. 
 
 The various institutes that execute policy in the countryside are clearly in need of 
strengthening and renovation as the government continues its efforts to reestablish 
services in rural areas.  These Institutes are discussed more fully in the various parts of 
this report devoted to their particular areas and jurisdictions.  However, it is important to 
note that the Ministry would benefit from an evaluation of the missions of each of these 
institutes and a comparison of this with the financial resources now allocated to each.  
Annex 3 indicates that the central apparatus receives by far the most funds, while 
institutes carry much less weight in terms of financial resources.  Within the institutes, 
INCA and INCER account for nearly $5 million between them, while IDA, responsible 
for providing services to what amounts to the majority of the country’s population, 
receives less than $4 million.  This contrasts with the IDF, responsible for forests, which 
receives more than $6 million. 
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 It should be stressed that ALL of these allocations are less than what can be easily 
justified, as funding to the agriculture sector in general is far less than what can or should 
be allocated.  However, an evaluation of relative priorities together with an allocation of 
funds which reflects these priorities seems to be lacking. 
 
 As a final point, it should be noted that all parts of Minader would benefit 
substantially from training and education.  Many of the staff desire additional training in 
their fields or in order to move to related areas, but have had little opportunity to do so 
for many years.  Assistance for study tours, educational leaves or short courses would be 
something that many in the ministry would like to take advantage of.  (See Section H 
below.) 
 
 
 
5. The Example of Mozambique and Proagri  
 
 While it would be a mistake to think that Angolan issues are directly parallel to 
those faced in Mozambique, there are nevertheless some important lessons that can be 
learned from the post-conflict experience in that country.  As in Angola, the long conflict 
led to a virtual disappearance of government support services from many rural areas, due 
both to security issues and to the extremely low levels of funding allocated to agriculture 
and the even lower levels that filtered down to the provincial and district levels. 
 
 Rehabilitation of agriculture and of agricultural support services in Mozambique 
were identified as a priority area for donor support, as is recommended for Angola in this 
report.  Major donors, including the World Bank, supported the formation of a unified 
sector investment planned called Proagri through which all support was channeled, and 
which was administered by a joint steering committee including donors and 
representatives of the agricultural ministry.  In this manner it was thought that the 
ministry capacity to manage project implementation and service provision could be 
strengthened and improved at the same time that badly needed farm level assistance 
could be provided. 
 
 Now entering into its second phase, the Proagri experiment has yielded several 
observations which are pertinent to the Angolan case both because of the similarity of the 
institutional structures that existed post-conflict in both countries and because of the 
similarity in the goals of agricultural rehabilitation and growth.  First and foremost is the  
perhaps common sense observation that if all aid is channeled through the central 
ministerial apparatus, then the central apparatus will be the primary beneficiary, with less 
of the aid getting directly to the farm level where it is needed.  Indeed, several observers 
of the Proagri program have noted that the strengthening of the central bureaucracy, 
though necessary, has not resulted in any benefits for many farmers and less benefits than 
hoped for at even intermediate levels; provincial, district, etc.  Remedying this perceived 
deficiency is one of the primary goals of the second phase of the project. 
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 It is for this reason that the strategy proposed here for Angola is intended to 
strongly support the government’s stated desire to decentralize government functions.  
Many of the functions required to support agriculture (extension and research chief 
among them) are not best done in Luanda.  Rather, it is important to locate them both 
physically and bureaucratically as near to the intended recipients as can reasonably be 
accomplished.  In this manner, functions such as extension can be built from the grass 
roots upward rather than from the center down. 
 
 Accordingly, an Angolan strategy would be conceptualized as a decentralized 
effort from the outset.  While it is certainly true that MINADER needs support and 
capacity building, it would be a mistake to expect this central bureaucracy to be able to 
provide or manage the farm level support needed in the short term or to delay this farm 
level support until the central capacity has been built.  Both tasks are important and both 
need to be addressed in the near term. 
 
 
 
G.  Reform of the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrario and Research Institutes  
 
 
1.  Extension 
 
 Most small farmers have not seen an extension agent in many years, if ever.  In 
addition, many demobilized soldiers and dislocated families have lost their close 
connection to agriculture in that children have grown up in other settings and so have not 
learned the trade from seeing and helping their parents as is normally the case.    
Improving this situation will be a fundamental element of a long term strategy to increase 
smallholder productivity.  The government extension system is extremely weak, 
understaffed and underfunded.  It will take years to rebuild, and while this is under way 
there is likely to be a distinct lack of adequate extension in the countryside. 
 
 The Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrario (IDA) is the unit within MINADER 
responsible for the rural extension system.  This institute has yet to develop sufficient 
experience with a decentralized mode of operation to fully take advantage of the 
opportunities that this presents.  The management structure of the Institute remains 
consistent with a view of agricultural extension that is explicitly top-down and which is 
not compatible with the needs defined in this strategy though the management has 
expressed a clear desire to operate in a decentralized manner.  However, there is a great 
need for an IDA that does a good job of performing necessary functions, among which 
are: 
 
- Information collection – One of the primary tasks of a well functioning extension 
system is the transmission of information from the farm level up to the higher levels in 
order to better inform decisions  
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- To be an advocate for the interests of smallholders 
 
- Training of extensionists 
 
- As a link to research efforts and a channel for dissemination of information 
 
 
 It should be noted that formulation of and dissemination of extension messages is 
not the role of the central apparatus in Luanda.  Such messages need to be formulated at 
lower levels so as to be informed by, and appropriate to, the particular regions and 
conditions for which they are intended. 
 
 The human capital element of extension is one of the most difficult to deal with in 
the short term.  The schools needed to educate these staff are only now being reactivated, 
which means that it will be quite some time before personnel can built up to the levels 
envisioned in even the most modest plans for extension.  NGO’s often hire the best 
workers since they can offer better salaries and working conditions than can the 
government.  Though this may be seen as a problem, if it is looked at from another angle 
it is perhaps beneficial in that the extensionists are kept in the business of doing extension 
work rather than seeking employment in another sector.  If NGO’s work cooperatively 
with government entities, there can be benefits in terms of institutional development as 
well. 
 
 In addition, it is important to develop financing mechanisms which provide the 
decentralized entities (provincial and lower) with their own resources which can be 
allocated independently of central control.  As noted above, this is a problem not unique 
to the agricultural sector. 
 
 
2.  Agricultural Research 
 
 Angola’s rural areas have not benefited from agricultural research for more than a 
quarter of a century.  With access to rural areas difficult at best, and often impossible in 
the most favorable agroclimatic zones, most smallholders are living in total isolation 
from any of the possible improvements in yield, or disease resistance or other 
characteristics that agricultural research and associated extension programs could bring.  
Accordingly, there is much in the way of “low hanging fruit” that can rapidly be put to 
use and disseminated for very large gains.28   
 
 The key is to fund such adaptive research at the farm level in order to achieve the 
potential gains as rapidly as possible.  Similarly “low tech” improvements are available in 
many staple food crops, including maize and cassava, which would have a significant 
impact on the nearly 50% overall national deficit in food availability while at the same 
time providing substantial gains at the farm level.  A collection of germplasm from 
national sources for a wide variety of crops exists within the country.  This invaluable 
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resource for plant research and improvement merits both support and exploitation to 
ensure that it can be used to benefit Angolan farmers. 
 
 It must be emphasized that very little of what is most cost effective in the present 
situation is what is commonly thought of as cutting edge agricultural research.  Rather, 
sustained application of known research methods to the problems of small farmers (many 
of whom have never been the target clientele of a research effort) can generate results in 
Angola as they have in many other parts of the world.  In a situation where the basic 
agroclimatic fundamentals are favorable, as they are in Angola, yields of 300-400 kg/ha 
leave a lot of room for relatively low cost improvement. 
 
 The primary agricultural research institution is the Instituto de Investigacao 
Agronomica (IIA) which has a network of nine agricultural research stations throughout 
the country.  It is centered in Luanda, but it is important to realize that very little of what 
happens in Luanda can be of any possible benefit to actual farmers except insofar as it 
can help to provide resources and personnel at the more decentralized levels where 
research must take place. 
 
 However, given the extremely tight budgets of this organization and the near total 
destruction of most of their existing facilities, it does not make sense to embark on a 
country wide strategy of rebuilding since spreading resources across all nine existing 
centers would result in a lack of critical mass in any one of them.  Rather, it makes sense 
to start with a subset of the research stations, focusing on rehabilitating only a few but 
ensuring that they can be brought up to the level where they can actually generate visible 
results in conjunction with local extension efforts. 
 
 A sensible strategy would be to focus first on the flagship research center in 
Huambo, which is located at the same site as the University’s Faculty of Agricultural 
Sciences at Chianga, and which has already begun rebuilding itself with funds from a 
variety of donors.  Also important would be the research center in the province of Huila, 
given its location in an important agroclimatic zone and the fact that it has not suffered 
the physical destruction of other locations.  Finally, the research center at Malange would 
be important due to its location in a the northern agroclimatic zone which, with its 
reliance on cassava, coffee, and other crops has issues distinct from those of the central 
highlands or the dryer southern region. 
 
 Rehabilitating and staffing even these three centers will be difficult enough but it 
will be important not to overreach at the beginning.  Creation of a viable community of 
researchers at a given location is important in enabling the institutions to attract the best 
available talent, as will proximity to and linkage with an extension effort capable of 
mediating the on-farm research that is key to success. 
 
 The situation in terms of animal research is somewhat more difficult.  The old 
IVA, Instituto de Investigacao Veterinaria, located in Huambo was the scene of several 
pitched battles during the civil war and was left totally destroyed.  Even touring the 
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grounds must be done with extreme caution given the many landmines that still exist 
around the campus.  While there are plans to rebuild on this site, serious consideration 
should be given to other alternatives given the difficulties and dangers of this particular 
location.   
 
 However, prior to rebuilding, this institute would benefit from a priority setting 
exercise to determine which activities are most supportive of the smallholder 
development that this strategy is trying to promote.  Many of the stated goals of the 
institute (e.g. a state of the art artificial insemination facility) would seem to be less in 
line with these goals than some other investments. 
 
 
3.  Unifying Management of Extension and Research 
 
 One reform which would go far toward creating the needed links between 
research and extension would be the creation of a unified management structure which 
would set priorities in funding and activities for both.  This would reflect the fact that 
research cannot be considered to be successful or worth the money put into it if it does 
not result in positive changes on the ground.  Similarly, extension activities must be 
explicitly linked to the research efforts that they support and which provide the rationale 
for  farmer centered activities.   
 
 Too often research centers tend to focus on priorities which are not in line with 
national needs, while extension workers remain uninformed about the latest 
improvements in techniques.  Using extension workers to help perform on-farm trials and 
pilot or demonstration studies can maximize the effectiveness and relevance of research. 
 
 One way to achieve this would be to constitute a steering committee composed of 
the directors of national research institutes, the extension system, the Faculty of 
Agriculture, and farmer organizations.  This committee would be responsible for 
commissioning studies of the returns to different kinds of research and would guide 
priorities accordingly.  Linkages between research and extension are equally important at 
the provincial and municipal levels. 
 
 
H.  Education 
 
 Higher education in basic agricultural sciences is centered on the Faculdade de 
Ciencias Agrarias at Chianga in Huambo.  Newly reopened in 2003, the Faculty shares 
facilities with the IIA, and also shares many of its senior staff.  Both benefit from the 
existence of a development project designed to reactivate smallholder production which 
uses IIA facilities, FCA students and staff, and also staff of the MINADER from the local 
Estacao de Desenvolvimento Agrario.  This type of linkage between research, teaching 
and extension has proven benefits in a variety of other countries, and is also an efficient 
use of scarce resources.   
 57
 
 To date the FCA has benefited from support by private donors, but its importance 
to agricultural development and policy is immense.  The need for trained staff in the 
ministry, in extension, and in research will far outstrip the demand for many years to 
come.  Thus, support to further development efforts which link to both research and 
teaching should be a high priority.  Similarly, the schools for medium level technicians  
 
(tecnicos medios, who constitute the bulk of extension agents) also form an important 
link since many of the current extension staff are old and will retire soon. 
 
 However, the most pressing need at the present time is for “tecnicos basicos” 
rather than higher level workers.  The current situation was described by MINADER as 
being an “inverted pyramid” where there are more high level technicians than lower ones.  
This suggests the need for expanded basic education in agriculture, not only to correct 
this problem, but also to keep the pipeline open to higher degrees. 
 
 
VI.  Action Plan 
 
 The action plan presented below can be found in summary form in Annex 9.  The 
matrix in the annex also includes suggested phasing/prioritization for the various options. 
 
 
A.  Policy Reform 
 
 Perhaps the single most important policy regarding agriculture is the exchange 
rate.  As discussed above and shown in Figure 8 the real exchange rate has appreciated by 
more than 40% since the beginning of 2001.  Given the continuation of the oil receipts 
and associated policies that cause it there is reason to believe that further appreciation 
could be a feature of the coming years as well.  There is a real possibility that this, 
combined with a reopening of transport routes which would allow imports to more 
readily penetrate the interior, could result in the prevention of agricultural development 
and production of marketed surpluses. 
 
 The conventional answer to problems of Dutch Disease is that those sectors on 
which the country will have to rely after the oil boom is over should be developed so that 
they do not stagnate during years of import exposure due to appreciation.  In the case of 
agriculture, this involves promoting productivity increases and production of surpluses at 
the farm level together with the necessary off-farm infrastructure and institutions that will 
connect farms with markets. 
 
 In terms of farm level productivity it seems clear that Angola has a large potential 
for increases in yields and off farm surpluses since current levels are low by world 
standards, and are even low by many African standards as well.  However, here there is a 
problem of timing – Development of the agricultural production potential will take 
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decades while flooding the country with imports can happen as soon as roads are opened.  
Indeed, development of the infrastructure and marketing system that connect farmers to 
markets can as easily work in reverse: Imports can flow inland on newly reopened roads 
just as easily as exports can flow to the coast.29 
 
 The priority attached to agricultural spending in the overall government budget is 
only about a tenth of the 10% level advocated by NEPAD.  Increasing this percentage 
should be a goal of policy dialogue in the future. 
 
 
 Another area of importance would be the elimination of limits on marketing 
margins for agricultural traders (indeed, for all traders) as well as confirmation of the 
elimination of the 10% consumption tax on agricultural inputs.  At the present time the 
exemption is available, but is not easily obtained from Customs without direct appeal to 
higher authorities in each case.  Publication and confirmation of this exemption would 
ease the import and sale of items such as fertilizer, implements, etc. 
 
 Regarding fertilizer, an explicit and publicly announced government policy to 
refrain from distribution and sale of fertilizer would help private sector growth in this 
area.  At the present time, periodic government distribution of free or subsidized supplies 
makes it impossible for the private sector to operate with any degree of confidence. 
 
 
B.  Road Building 
 
 As noted above, it would be very difficult to overstate the importance of 
increasing access via a program of tertiary road rehabilitation.   Even if nothing beyond 
this were done, reestablishing access and market contact for isolated populations would 
be a major improvement for many rural areas. 
 
 A large roads and bridges project is already in place and will begin in the next few 
months.  However, though this project has a tertiary road component, it is limited in 
geographical scope and can be considered to be a pilot project for a larger subsequent 
effort.  Accordingly, in conjunction with other programs aimed at smallholders, it is 
recommended that a broader labor intensive road building and maintenance program be 
initiated at the village level.  As noted above, this will have the benefit of opening 
marketing links while at the same time providing a cash infusion to the local economy. 
 
 
C.  Marketing 
 
 The recommendations here are drawn both from this study and Economic and 
Sector Work performed in preparation for this study30 as well as the FAO Agriculture 
Sector Survey of 2004.  Marketing is key to the development of rural areas and of 
agriculture, but is neglected by the current institutional arrangements and emphases of the 
government.  Indeed, much of the information needed to implement investments and 
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reforms is still lacking, but enough is known to proceed in the most important areas 
 
1.  Support the creation of a market policy and data analysis unit within MINADER 
reporting directly to the Minister and Vice Ministers.  There is currently no unit within 
the Ministry with the primary task of providing such analyses.  The experience of 
Mozambique is extremely relevant in this regard and a study trip for the responsible 
members of the Ministry should be sponsored in support of this goal.  
 
2.  Implement a market data collection system based on that already pioneered by the 
USAID supported Famine Early Warning System, which has the beginnings of a 
provincial network of workers collecting data on prices of agricultural goods and costs of 
marketing and transport.  This system is well constructed but underfunded and lacking in 
geographical coverage.  It might be possible to accomplish this by using some of the staff 
of the Gabinete de Seguranca Alimentar as a nucleus but this could only be done if 
substantial training and capacity building is undertaken. 
  
3. Support farm level cost of production and market linkage studies in various 
agroclimatic zones to establish the basic information needed for interventions to promote 
food security and marketed surplus.  These, together with cost of transport and marketing 
studies noted above can provide the basis for evaluating the competitiveness of 
alternative crops for export or domestic sale in different regions. 
 
4.  Support the initiation of marketing chain studies for principal crops, based on 
collaboration with the private sector.  These will help to identify bottlenecks and 
infrastructural investments needed. 
 
5.  Support explicit inclusion of marketing content in extension programs (see extension 
section) through EDA’s and/or NGO’s operating in the country. 
 
6.  As noted above under policy reform, eliminate all marketing margin controls enforced 
by the Ministry of Commerce as well as confirming and publicizing the exemption to the 
requirement for farmers to pay the 10% consumption tax on agricultural inputs. 
 
7.  Support investments in municipal markets where these are lacking, to allow traders 
and merchants a focal point for buying and selling produce.   
 
8. Where existing infrastructure is government owned, allow for private sector leasing or 
purchase as has been done elsewhere in Africa.  An immediate tfirst step would be the 
completion of an inventory of existing facilities coupled with an evaluation of their 
condition. 
 
9.  Assist community level storage efforts through microcredit or FAS or a related 
mechanism. 
 
10.  Support research in farm level storage methods appropriate to Angolan conditions.  
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In particular, cooperate with the FAO to determine which of their existing plans for such 
facilitites would be most amenable to Angolan conditions and local manufacture. 
 
11.  Review appropriate functions for the Instituto Nacional de Cereais and affirm that 
the government has no intention to become active in buying and/or selling grain or other 
agricultural products for market stabilization or other purposes. 
 
12.  Make an effort to eliminate roadblocks and other security problems along transport 
routes that inhibit the free circulation of goods. 
 
13.  Support extension of telecommunications and IT to rural areas to facilitate access to 
market and other information. 
 
 
 
D.  Smallholder Development 
 
 As noted above, the key to success is a broad effort to support and develop 
smallholder agriculture in high potential zones.  As emphasized above, this is not a direct 
poverty alleviation program in that it is not intended to achieve universal coverage of the 
smallholder sector.  Rather, it is intended to stimulate growth and its consequent 
multiplier effects by focusing on improving marketing in conjunction with farm level 
efforts to increase production.  The following actions will form the core of the effort: 
 
1.  In conjunction with both decentralized government entities and NGO’s with the ability 
to reach directly to the farm level, expand existing development projects in the Planalto 
and other favored regions which focus on smallholders.  These projects integrate on-farm 
research, extension, credit/input supply mechanisms and, most importantly, marketing  
chain development to support sustainable increases in farm household welfare and 
marketed surplus. 
 
2.  Continue and expand development of farmer associations to mediate the above series 
of interventions where this is indicated. 
 
3.  As noted below, provide direct assistance to the decentralized functions of research 
and extension in project areas. 
 
4.  Provide a support for domestic banks such as Banco Sol to create incentives for 
lending to small scale enterprises in marketing, transport, input supply, food processing, 
manufacture of implements, multiplication of seed and draft animals, and other rural 
small enterprises. 
 
5.  Expand the activities of the FAS to include more productive investments such as 
communal grain storage facilities or other infrastructure of a productive nature. 
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6.  Where needed, support labor intensive tertiary road rehabilitation work to both 
increase access to isolated villages and also to provide an injection of cash into these 
areas. 
 
 In terms of timing, the traditional grain surplus zones of the planalto together with 
periurban zones offer the most immediate returns (given adequate road or rail access) 
while animal production will take somewhat longer to rehabilitate given natural rate of 
increase constraints for draft animals.  Fertile and wetter areas to the north offer 
considerable returns but over a longer time horizon.  However, it should be noted that 
large commercial operations in periurban areas are less in need of government support 
than smallholders will. 
 
 
E.  Input Supply and Support Services 
 
 The following recommendations follow from the above discussion: 
 
1.  Initiate pilot projects in each of several agroclimatic zones aimed at strengthening 
provincial and municipio level extension functions.  In particular, emphasis on services 
such as marketing and other market related activities such as storage at the village and 
farm level.  However, it is important NOT to get extension services into the business of 
providing inputs or buying output directly. 
 
2.  Support expansion of educational programs for extension staff in Huila and Huambo. 
 
3.  Review current seed multiplication projects in order to evaluate the appropriateness of 
replication of those which appear most promising particularly those supported under the 
current EMRP project. 
 
4.  Publicly announce intention to keep government out of fertilizer and seed distribution.  
Instead, support auction of existing government fertilizer stocks or other input supplies at 
point of import and/or provincial capitals.  Consider the feasibility of domestic fertilizer 
production. 
 
5.  Study appropriate functions of Mecanagro and reform as appropriate.  In particular, 
Mecanagro has a potentially important function in road rehabilitation in rural areas, 
where it is of course free to bid on road building contracts as is any other contractor, but 
should not be directly engaged in production.  The history of experience with these 
activities in Angola and around the world demonstrates that this is an inefficient use of 
resources. 
 
 
F.  Decentralization and Institutional Reform 
 
1.  Perform a national agricultural survey over the next crop year (November – May) to 
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form an accurate information base regarding area planted and crops harvested to support 
all subsequent decision making.  The WFP system of monitors could be used to perform 
such a survey.  Such a survey could provide the first task of a newly reinforced and 
independent statistical unit within MINADER. 
 
2.  Support establishment of a market oriented policy analysis unit within MINADER  
reporting directly to the ministerial level.   Support needed training and capacity building 
to perform needed market analysis. 
 
3.  Support reform of research and extension functions as follows: 
 
 -  Support EDA’s at the municipal level as planned in the government 
decentralization initiative as noted above under smallholder development. 
 
 - Support rebuilding and training at three IIA research centers at Humpata, 
Chianga, and Malange. 
 
 -  Support direct linkage between research in extension at both the decentralized 
and central levels.   At the farm level, this can be done through smallholder development 
projects with an on-farm research and demonstration component.  At the central level, a 
steering committee to set priorities and funding for research and development could 
provide the necessary focus on the goal of increasing smallholder output and welfare.  
Such a committee could have representation from research institutes, the extension 
service, the Faculty of Agriculture, and farmer associations. 
 
4.  Support education and capacity building through the following steps: 
 
 - Support rehabilitation of schools and training centers for tecnicos basicos and  
  medios. 
 
 - Support the Faculdade de Ciencias Agronomicas and its links with the IIA  
  through continued education for staff and links with outside institutions. 
 
 - Support training for IDA staff at all levels, but particularly in decentralized  
  organs. 
 
5.  Conduct a study devoted to assisting Minader to specify missions and roles of its 
internal organs in a reformed and decentralized environment.  This study could also 
specify particular capacity building and manpower needs in each subunit. 
 
 
G.  Irrigation and Water Control 
 
1.  Provide technical assistance to DNHER in formulating a national irrigation policy to 
shift its focus from one of managing large scale irrigation schemes to one of research and 
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development of smaller scale water control technologies.  These smaller scale schemes 
would integrate irrigation into a broader scheme of water use including drinking water, 
aquaculture and other items appropriate to particular locations. 
 
2.  Existing large projects require institutional development of systems of water rights 
and management. 
 
 
H.  Land Tenure and Titling 
 
 The following actions are based on the discussion above and are discussed in 
greater detail in the Land Tenure Study written in preparation for this strategy.  As noted 
above, the FAO is currently responsible for implementing a pilot project aimed at these 
objectives. Pending evaluation of this effort, additional support may be indicated for 
expansion and/or replication of this project in additional areas. 
 
1.  Improve technical capacity in cadastre and registration at the provincial and national 
levels including information collection needed to support the system. 
 
2.  Assist national and local governments in implementation of participatory methods in 
the Angolan context. 
 
 
3. Publicize requirements for legal recognition of tenure.  Post explicitly at all offices of 
provincial and municipal government. 
 
4.   Initiate registration of community and other smallholdings under current legislative 
framework in a series of pilot projects in areas with the most severe pressure on land. 
 
 
I.  HIV/AIDS 
 
 While an overall HIV/AIDS policy is beyond the scope of this strategy, there are 
some particular initiatives directly related to agriculture which should be pursued. 
 
1.  Require basic AIDS education for all extension workers. 
 
2.  Support HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programs in conjunction with all road 
rehabilitation projects. 
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NOTES 
 
1  This note (drawn from the FAO’s sector program review) provides more details on the activities of 
the World Bank and the EC, the two largest potential donors for the agricultural sector.  In the last ten 
years, aid has been oriented to humanitarian activities (food security, resettlement of IDP, food and tools 
kits to IDP). The flow of financial aid and the number of beneficiaries vary from year to year, depending on 
the absorption capacity, accessibility to remote areas and break of peace. The main areas of intervention 
include: food security (food aid, distribution of food and tools); emergency and rehabilitation of social 
services (health, education, water and drainage systems); support to resettlement of IDP; and institutional 
improvement.  
 
 During 1986-2000, EC  allocated 700 million Euros on aid to Angola, to support emergency and 
rehabilitation, with emphasis on food aid (mainly after 1992). The rehabilitation had health, agriculture and 
rehabilitation of rural and urban infrastructures, as focal sectors. During 2001-2002, more than two thirds 
of the aid provided by EC was for humanitarian activities (food security, demining and social reinsertion of 
IDP), emergency and rehabilitation (health and agriculture). 
 
 In the context of the peace agreements of 4 April 2002 and through the Emergency Programme 
and Support to the Peace Process, the EC provided 30 millions Euros to be spent (Dec. 2002 – Dec. 2004) 
on health, nutrition, water and drainage systems (8.5 million Euros), education, protection and child 
reinsertion (5 million Euros), humanitarian demining (7 million Euros), resettlement of IDP (7 million 
Euros) and logistic of transport (1 million Euros). This programme has the objective of providing support to 
the most vulnerable resettled IDP. An important share of these resources is being channelled through the 
UN system (UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, FAO, ACNUR and WFP).  The Programme provides also funds for 
institutional support through UNDP and the national institution for demining (CNIDAH) under the long-
term Programme for National Humanitarian Demining. The expected beneficiaries of the Programme are 8 
million people.  
  
 The Transition Programme for Support to the IDP (16.3 million Euros) started in the last quarter 
of 2002 and will end in November 2005, cover five provinces and has been implemented by eight 
international NGO’s. The Programme will provide support for improvement of Health, water and drainage 
systems. In a long-term, it will continue implement actions of health support to handicapped people, 
victims of war and mines (14 million Euros) and rehabilitation of municipal health systems of central plan 
provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Bié and Huila – 25 million Euros). Moreover, measures to combat and 
prevent HIV/AIDS were included in all projects underway. Since the beginning of the Programme 9 
hospitals and 68 health centres have been recovered.  Around 1,350.000 people have received medical and 
nutritional support and 46 therapeutic and nutritional centres have been assisted.  Food aid and protection 
have also benefited 223,500 and 800,000 people, respectively. 
   
 The Rehabilitation Support Programme (PAR) has been implemented in two phases. The first 
phase 2001-2002 with resources of 27.5 million Euros and the second phase, 2002-2004, with 27.5 million 
Euros. The Programme has incidence on rural areas, food security and revitalization of social services 
(health, education, water and drainage systems), technical assistance, demining, institutional support, 
capacity building and coordination.  
 
 For the current transition phase, there are 83 million Euros are still available through the European 
Development Fund (EDF). The Delegation of CE in Angola and the national authorities are preparing the 
proposals for the efficient utilization of the funds already available in EDF to socio-economic reinsertion of 
displaced and demobilised populations and rehabilitation of social services (health, education, water and 
drainage systems) and also secondary roads; demining; co-finance government programmes to support 
public institutions in collaboration with other donors, specially the World Bank. It is expected that the first 
proposals for financing be prepared until the end of 2003.   
 
 73
                                                                                                                                                 
  The most recent World Bank projects for Angola, financed by the International Development 
Association (IDA-WB), include a project (1998) to support the then expected return of IDP to the their 
communities (Social Action Fund 1 (FAS1) of US$ 33 million and FAS2 (2000), a successor project to the 
successful 1998 FAS1. In addition, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) approved support for a 
soap manufacturer in Angola (in 1998) and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has issued four 
guarantees. In mid-1999, as a result of unstable economic conditions, the resumption of significant fighting, 
a shrinking portfolio and lack of conditions conducive to new lending, the Bank reduced its country Officer 
to a Liaison Officer and declined to replace a vacating Resident Representative. 
 
 WB activities for the next 12 months have been designed within the purview of the Transitional 
Support Strategy TSS), with the single exception of FAS2 - a community-driven development project of 
the type that would be appropriate in Angola’s post-conflict context in any case. The TSS (Table A.5) is 
organized under three pillars: first, enhance the transparency, efficiency and credibility of public resources 
management; second expending service delivery to war-affected and other vulnerable groups; and third, 
preparing the ground for broad-based pro-poor economic growth.  
 
2 Angola - FAO/WP Cooperative Work Programme – Economic Sector Work Studies, 2004. 
 
3 Data collection systems are extremely deficient, particularly outside of Luanda, making reported figures 
difficult to rely on.  The government’s statistical network is largely non-existent outside of major cities, 
with even the size of the population a subject of some debate.  Oil production estimates are better known, 
though the disposition of oil receipts has been a major bone of contention between the government and 
international lending institutions.  Allegations of huge diversions have been made but verification of these 
claims has been difficult.  Recent moves toward more transparency are very welcome, but do little to 
improve historical information.  
 
4 The experience of other post-conflict countries indicates that a strong growth rate can be expected during 
the process of resettlement and reactivation of subsistence production.  Indeed, when a family’s production 
starts from zero, as is the case with millions of deslocados, any amount of production at all will look large 
when stated in terms of growth rates.  The more difficult task will be the period after resettlement and 
rehabilitation, when growth depends on the success of rural development policies more generally.  In 
addition, as farmers move beyond subsistence production to selling marketed surplus in cities, the effects of 
exchange rate distortions and competing grain imports will also have a powerful effect on output growth 
and the extent to which they can successfully compete with imports. 
5 There are signs of movement toward renewed stability already, with inflation this past year coming in at a 
little less than 76%,  or a little more than half of the figure posted for 2002.  The improvement is largely 
due to the government’s avoidance of money creation for deficit finance purposes though the deficit itself 
amounted to about 10% of GDP, little changed from the 2002 figure.  The government has used a 
combination of oil receipts and international borrowing to cover its expenses, and though this creates other 
problems, it has allowed the rate of inflation to be kept low when combined with the policy of using foreign 
exchange reserves to buy Kwanzas in order to sterilize large oil financed expenditures.  It is hoped that 
inflation in 2004 can be kept to a level of 30%.   Given the record of only 8% accumulated inflation during 
the first three months of the year, this goal would seem to be attainable.  
 There is still some way to go in enforcing fiscal control, though there has been progress there as 
well.  The expenditures as executed still remain out of line with the budget as passed by the legislature.  
However, the government has made enormous progress in consolidating and unifying the reporting of 
government receipts and expenditures, so that the situation at the present time is markedly better than in the 
past.  Nevertheless, though a far greater share of expenditures are now accounted for within the system, 
there remain some problems with keeping expenditures from growing beyond levels authorized. 
 Perhaps the biggest area of concern for donors has been that of transparency.  Inability to account 
for hundreds of millions of dollars of oil receipts dominated multilateral and bilateral relationships, and led 
to a deterioration of relations in the recent past.  However, the government has been moving toward 
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resolving this issue as well, and it has reportedly followed through on the plans made for auditing and 
accounting at Sonangol, the Banco Nacional de Angola, and the Treasury, which will be likely to result in a 
marked improvement in donor willingness to fund a broad range of development projects.   As noted above, 
recent announcements regarding receipts from oil companies show good faith on the part of the 
government, and continuation of this new policy of transparency will greatly smooth relations with 
international organizations. 
 
6 At the present time the government is financing the fiscal deficit largely with foreign exchange.  
Effectively this means using foreign exchange  to buy Kwanzas in the open market with consequent 
dampening effect on inflation and the maintenance of an exchange rate substantially higher than would 
otherwise be the case.  The natural reaction of most economists to this type of situation is that it is not 
sustainable - at some point the availability of foreign exchange to continue the policy will become limited, 
leading to a fall in the currency and a new policy regime.   However, in the Angolan case the government 
will be receiving huge inflows of oil receipts starting this year as new production comes on line, meaning 
that this policy can be continued longer than would be the case in most other countries, though this is in 
some doubt given the large amount of oil backed debt which has effectively mortgaged much of production 
for the next several years.   
 The real question is whether this is the optimal use of foreign exchange reserves.  It has been 
reported that in 2003 the government spent approximately $2 billion out of a total GDP of $11 billion 
supporting the Kwanza.  This policy has continued in 2004 at a rate of $250 million each month.  A better 
outcome could be achieved with a reduction of the government deficit and consequent reduction in the need 
to use exchange reserves to finance monetary intervention.  This is a key policy change in terms of the 
agricultural sector since continued real exchange rate appreciation will pose serious problems for domestic 
producers. 
 
7 See World Bank Pink Sheets, f.o.b. price at US Gulf Ports 
8 Based on average freight rate for grain imports to Angola reported by World Food Program for shipments 
in non-U.S. flag vessels from U.S. Gulf ports. 
9 This adds the $60/MT ex-Lobito trucking cost to the $184 ex-port landed cost, and compares it with  the 
reported “off truck” price in Huambo of $190/MT.  It should be noted that this “off-truck” price was 
measured as an average of prices in the vicinity of Caala, which could be somewhat lower than the price in 
Huambo city itself. 
10 Indeed, the freight cost of $60 was raised to $78 in May of 2004 due to mine problems.  These, together 
with a near total lack of road maintenance greatly contribute to the high price for transport at the present 
time. 
11 This section draws on the Economic and Sector Work performed in Angola in the Spring of 2004 
12 Investment in primary and secondary roads is under the mandate of the Ministry of Public Works, but 
responsibility for tertiary roads is less clear. Mechanagro, a parastatal corporation under MINADER, 
should in theory have a major responsibility for tertiary roads in rural areas, but lacks both financial and 
human resources for this role.  
13 The reasons for this are multiple but we can point to several important factors.  First, and most obvious, 
is the close identification of the MPLA with Soviet bloc countries during the long years of conflict with 
UNITA.  The support received by the government was not just military, but also included many advisors 
and a significant educational program in which young Angolans were sent to Cuba, Russia, and other 
eastern bloc countries for education.  A second factor is the relative linguistic isolation of many Angolan 
elites, who speak only Portuguese and have not been able to read much of the debate over economic policy 
that has gone on in the past quarter century.  Finally, it is also the case that the MPLA decisively won the 
war against UNITA.  They did so without a wholesale liberalization or reform of their system and hence 
have not been brought face to face with any imperative that would require them to change it.  All of these 
factors contribute to a world view which focuses on command and control and which equates government 
involvement with government direction of activities.  
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14 Jornal de Angola May 17, 2004 article entitled “Mecanagro pretende 400 tractores para cobrir todo o 
pais”. 
15 See “Land Tenure Study”  World Bank Economic Sector Work, Angola, 20004. 
16 The example of Kenya is quite instructive in this regard.  In Kenya, coffee and tea are not large farm 
crops.  Rather, they are produced by small to medium farmers who sell through an association to the export 
market.  There is little about the technology of growing coffee that requires it to be grown on large 
plantations.  It is a very labor intensive crop which requires careful cultivation and which is very suitable 
for small farmers to grow and which can be marketed individually or through cooperatives.  Indeed, small 
farmers grow it in many parts of Latin America, as well as in Africa.  In Angola, given the current near 
zero state of coffee production, there is much to recommend promoting it as a smallholder crop rather than 
as a plantation crop. 
17 ‘O Sistema Financeiro e de Crédito Rural em Angola’.  Robert Telleria and Isabel Monteiro, Working 
Paper No.9,  TCP/ANG/2907, FAO. January 2004. 
18 BCI was programmed for privatization in 2003, but this did not occur. 
19 Reported by World Vision staff. 
20 See “Irrigation and Water Management Study”  Economic Sector Work, World Bank Angola, 2004 
21 In line with this, a useful categorization is given in Tickner, “Marketing Chain and Supply Study”  
World Bank Economic and Sector Work 2004: 
a)   Those areas with current close proximity to large potential markets or from which 
produce can easily be exported. Currently such areas are to be found in parts of the 
provinces of Luanda, Bengo, Benguela, Cabinda (because of oil industry), and Lunda 
Norte/Lunda Sul (because of diamonds). 
b)   Those areas in which access to markets is still difficult, and only likely to be 
economically viable within a few years. Currently such areas include parts of Uige, 
Malange, Kwanza Norte, Zaire, Kwanza Sul, Huambo, Bie and Huila. 
c)   Those areas where only one or two individual commodities (e.g. cattle) are likely to be 
economically viable. Currently such areas are to be found in parts of the provinces of 
Kunene and Namibe. 
d)   Those areas where marketing is likely to remain a problem for the foreseeable future, 
because they are so remote from major markets. Currently such areas are to be found in 
parts of the provinces of Malange, Lunda Sul, Moxico, Bie and Kwando Kubango. 
 
 The first two categories represent the areas likeliest to result in positive returns in the time frame 
envisioned by, e.g. World Bank projects, but even within these categories there are vast differences in the 
actual strategies that can be envisioned.  For example, the mainly maize based systems of the central 
provinces require different interventions than do the wetter cassava and other crop based systems of Uige 
and Zaire. 
22 This section draws on Economic and Sector Work performed by the FAO in 2004. 
23 Any doubt of these statements will be dispelled by reading the history of the resource curse in low 
income countries.  An excellent explication of the problem and compendium of country experiences can be 
found in Alan Gelb, ed. Oil Windfalls – Blessing or Curse?, World Bank, 1989. 
24 Of particular interest is the experience of Mozambique with the Proagri program.  This multi-donor 
sector wide project succeeded in channeling donor funds through a single mechanism in the agriculture 
ministry but was less successful (in its first years) in getting this translated into real increases at provincial 
and lower levels.  Concerted effort  by donors and counterparts succeeded in changing this pattern by the 
end of the first five-year phase but it is notable that even this has not yet resulted in the hoped-for increases 
in services and results at the farm level.    
25 As for many other data, however, conflicting figures exist for MINADER headquarters staffing, with an 
estimate of 496 also being provided. 
26 See Oscar Monteiro and Antonio Caetano de Sousa “Decentralization in Angola” in A Descentralizacao 
em Angola – Texto de Analise e Legislacao de base, PNUD 2002. In particular, see page 106: “The number 
and functions of the provincial directorates were not defined at the time the law was adopted” and page 107 
“ … the law decree no. 17/99 dated 29th October, extinguished the Provincial Delegations, excepting the 
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…. Ministries of Interior, Justice and Finance.  Directorates are parts of the Provincial governments, 
reporting to the Governor, while Delegations are depend on and report to line Ministers.   
27 Regarding financial flows, see Jose Brakarz, Paulo Henrique Rodrigues e Francisco Bruno Soares 
“Descentralizacao e Desconcentracao em Angola” in A Descentralizacao em Angola – Texto de Analise e 
Legislacao de base, PNUD 2002.  In particular, note page 156:  “…nao existe diferenciacao entre as 
financas dos governos central e locais”  and “  Na actualidade, as receitas arrecadadas por quaisquer 
entidades governamentais sao recolhidas a uma conta unica, no Banco Nacional de Angola , a integrar as 
receitas gerais do Estado”.   
28 To take just one example, there are well adapted and disease resistant varieties of potatoes, a major cash 
crop in the highlands, that yield half as much per hectare as readily available improved varieties from the 
international research centers.  Incorporation of disease resistance characteristics in higher yielding 
varieties is a very basic plant breeding task that could be easily achieved at a very low cost. 
 
29 One response to this problem could be the imposition of tariffs on grain imports.  While this is usually 
anathema to economists (and certainly to the author of this study) it is important to weigh the costs and 
benefits of allowing agriculture to stagnate.  Nigeria is an instructive example in this connection, where a 
vibrant agricultural economy was destroyed, fueling large rural-urban migrations, chronic food imports and 
large social dislocations.  Unlike Angola, the majority of the agricultural population did not suffer the 
dislocations and physical destruction of war – their problems were entirely economic in nature.  In Angola 
the costs of these social dislocations should not be minimized given that a large portion of the agricultural 
population are former UNITA supporters.  A return to armed conflict, though not likely at the present, is 
something that would be so costly as to swamp any cost-benefit calculation and accordingly should be 
avoided at all costs. 
 To be clear, this study is NOT recommending the erection of tariff barriers.  It would be much 
preferred to avoid the real appreciation that is causing the problem in the first place.  However, it should be 
recognized that if appreciation does continue, agricultural development projects will not succeed and 
pressure for protectionist measures will grow.  Given the economic and social realities of the Angolan 
situation, it is not obvious that these pressures will be resisted nor is it entirely obvious that the costs 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
30 Tickner, Vincent, “Marketing and Supply Chain Study” 2004, World Bank. 
 
 
 

